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The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of
how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s
separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed
specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time
through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed
largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the
President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue
as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance.
Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how
historical practice can inform constitutional understandings but also how these
understandings can change. Whereas it was generally understood throughout
the nineteenth century that the termination of treaties required congressional
involvement, the consensus on this issue disappeared in the early parts of the
twentieth century, and today it is widely (although not uniformly) accepted that
presidents have a unilateral power of treaty termination. This shift in
constitutional understandings did not occur overnight or in response to one
particular episode but rather was the product of a long accretion of Executive
Branch claims and practice in the face of congressional inaction. An
examination of the way in which historical practice has shaped the
constitutional debates and understandings concerning this issue can help shed
light on some of the interpretive and normative challenges associated with a
practice-based approach to the separation of powers.
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Introduction
Historical practice is frequently invoked in debates and decisions
concerning the Constitution’s distribution of authority between Congress
and the President. On issues ranging from the President’s authority to make
recess appointments, to the role of Congress in authorizing military
operations, to the validity of “executive agreements” with foreign nations,
the way in which the government has operated over time is invoked as
evidence of constitutional meaning.1 Such governmental practice is
sometimes referred to as “historical gloss,” after Justice Frankfurter’s
contention in the Youngstown2 steel-seizure case that “a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”3
This Article presents a detailed case study of historical gloss, focused
on presidential authority to terminate treaties. Treaty termination is an
especially rich example of how governmental practices can inform and even
define the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate
treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead
has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This
practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite
these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise
them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law,

1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (considering the role of historical practice in
debates and decisions relating to the separation of powers); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984) (same).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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not merely political happenstance. Legal scholars, too, have long discussed
and debated the issue in legal terms. At the same time, there has been a
recognition that the constitutional law in this area is not entirely distinct
from politics, and that it both is informed by and shapes political
contestation.
The example of treaty termination illustrates not only how a
constitutional gloss on governmental authority can develop but also how it
can change. As will be seen, the center of gravity of the debate over treaty
termination has shifted substantially over time, from whether the full
Congress or merely the Senate needs to approve a termination to whether
Congress or the Senate can even limit the President’s unilateral authority to
terminate. One can identify a pattern of change, the contours of which may
apply to other issues of constitutional law relating to presidential authority:
First there is a consensus, both among the governmental actors and in the
scholarly community. Then deviations take place with a potentially limited
scope. The Executive Branch proceeds to articulate broader theories of the
deviations. Congress’s resistance is intermittent, depending on whether it
objects to the deviations on policy grounds. Practice then builds up around
low-stakes examples. Eventually a more controversial example arises and
the President pushes forward successfully, thereby consolidating the
changed understanding.
In developing the case study, this Article makes three contributions.
First, it presents the most complete and accurate account to date of the
historical practice of U.S. treaty terminations. In addition to reviewing
various publicly available materials, such as congressional hearings and
presidential proclamations, this Article considers a number of internal legal
memoranda obtained from the State Department archives. Second, this
Article recovers a nineteenth-century understanding of treaty-termination
authority that has largely been lost from modern considerations of the issue,
pursuant to which the termination of treaties, like the making of treaties,
was generally understood by both Congress and the President as a shared
power.
Most modern accounts acknowledge vaguely that treaty
terminations have been accomplished in a variety of ways throughout U.S.
history but fail to appreciate the sharp contrast between the modern
presidential unilateralism and the nineteenth-century practices and
understandings. In endorsing a unilateral presidential power to terminate
treaties, for example, the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law notes in passing that “[p]ractice has varied”
without acknowledging that presidential unilateralism is almost entirely a
twentieth-century development.4 Third, this Article uses this historical

4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 339 reporters’ note 2 (1987) (“Practice has varied, the President sometimes terminating an
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record as a window into the nature of a practice-based approach to
constitutional interpretation and some of its limitations and challenges.
Part I of this Article provides the legal and theoretical background
needed to understand and assess the historical practice of U.S. treaty
terminations. It describes both the allowable grounds under international
law for terminating a treaty, as well as the textual and structural arguments
relating to the Constitution’s assignment of treaty termination authority. It
also considers some of the reasons why historical practice has played a
significant role in constitutional debates surrounding this issue. Parts II
and III review the practice of treaty termination throughout U.S. history.
Part II shows that, at least until the late nineteenth century, it was generally
understood that presidents needed the agreement of Congress or the Senate
in order to terminate a treaty. Part III recounts how this understanding
changed in the twentieth century, a process that occurred over the course of
decades as a result of repeated claims and actions by the Executive Branch
in the face of congressional inaction. Part IV assesses the implications of
the case study, both with respect to the specific question of treatytermination authority as well as the more general issue of the proper role of
historical practice in the separation of powers area. It concludes by
reflecting on the relationship between law and politics for practice-based
norms of institutional authority.
I.

Legal and Theoretical Background

This Part provides the legal and theoretical background needed to
understand and assess the historical practice of U.S. treaty terminations. It
begins by explaining the circumstances under which international law
allows a nation to terminate a treaty. It then considers the textual and
structural considerations that are relevant to determining which actors in the
United States have the constitutional authority to terminate treaties.
Finally, it describes why historical practice plays an especially important
role in constitutional debates concerning this issue.
A.

International-Law Standards

Treaties are binding on nations as a matter of international law.
Ultimately, therefore, whether a nation’s treaty commitments are terminated
is determined by international law, not U.S. law.5 As a result, before
considering the U.S. constitutional issues, it is important to understand first
what international law provides about treaty termination. The modern rules

agreement on his own authority, sometimes doing so when requested by Congress or by the
Senate alone.”).
5. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 634 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (describing the international-law standards governing
treaty termination).
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on this subject are set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,6 which took effect in 1980 and has now been ratified by over 110
nations.7 Although the United States is not a party to the Convention,
Executive Branch officials have stated at various times that they regard the
Convention as largely reflective of binding rules of international custom,8
and U.S. courts also regularly refer to the Convention.9 In addition, the
International Court of Justice has specifically observed that “in many
respects” the Vienna Convention’s provisions on the suspension or
termination of treaty provisions reflect binding custom.10
Under the Convention, there are a variety of circumstances that can
render a party’s consent to a treaty invalid. Some of these circumstances
merely make the treaty voidable at the party’s discretion. For example, “[i]f
a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of
another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its
consent to be bound by the treaty.”11 Other circumstances automatically
void the treaty. For example, “[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”12 When a
treaty is deemed void, it will be considered never to have created
obligations.13
Whereas some circumstances will allow a party to void even its past
treaty obligations, other circumstances will allow it to terminate or suspend
its treaty obligations going forward. For example, a party may suspend or
terminate its obligations under a bilateral treaty if the other treaty party has
materially breached the treaty.14 In addition, “[a] party may invoke the
impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or

6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT].
7. Chapter XXIII of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (last updated Feb. 3, 2014), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
DetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. 3, intro. note (1987) (documenting Executive Branch statements); see also Maria Frankowska,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L.
281, 286 (1988) (“[A]ccording to a widespread opinio juris, legal conviction of the international
community, the Vienna Convention represents a treaty which to a large degree is a restatement of
customary rules . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although the United
States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, our Court relies on it ‘as an
authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,’ insofar as it reflects actual state
practices.”).
10. Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 46 (Sept. 25).
11. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 49.
12. Id. art. 52.
13. See id. art. 69, para. 1 (“The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.”).
14. Id. art. 60, para. 1.
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withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of
the treaty.”15 Furthermore, under narrow circumstances, a party may invoke
a fundamental change of circumstances as a basis for suspending or
terminating a treaty.16 Treaty obligations can also be suspended or
terminated if the parties expressly agree to such suspension or termination
or act to conclude a new superseding treaty, or if the treaty expressly
provides for suspension or termination after a certain period of time or in
response to certain events.17
Finally, nations may also withdraw from (or “denounce”) a treaty that
expressly provides for a right of withdrawal.18 Such withdrawal clauses are
common in modern treaties and often include a required notice period
before the termination will take effect.19 In some instances, a right of
withdrawal will be implied. The Vienna Convention states that:
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and
which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject
to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be
implied by the nature of the treaty.20
When there is an implied right of withdrawal, the Vienna Convention states
that the party seeking to withdraw from the treaty shall give at least twelve
months’ notice.21 A nation that withdraws from a treaty is bound by any
obligations that arose before the effective date of the withdrawal.22
The rules of treaty termination that existed at the time of the
constitutional founding were less developed and incorporated distinctions
that are no longer relevant, such as a distinction between treaties that
obligated only the particular monarchs making them and treaties that
obligated their nations in perpetuity.23
Nevertheless, these rules
encompassed certain grounds for terminating a treaty that we would
recognize today, such as a material breach by the other party.24 It is worth
15. Id. art. 61, para. 1.
16. Id. art. 62, para. 1.
17. Id. arts. 54, 57, 59.
18. The terms “denunciation” and “withdrawal” are often used interchangeably to refer to a
voluntary act of treaty termination. Helfer, supra note 5, at 635.
19. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82, 1597–98 (2005).
20. VCLT, supra note 6, art. 56, para. 1.
21. Id. art. 56, para. 2.
22. Id. art. 70, para. 1(b).
23. See, e.g., 1 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
bk. 2, §§ 187–197 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
24. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW
524 (Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2006) (1763); 2 HUGO
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 405 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press
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noting, however, that although clauses in treaties allowing for unilateral
withdrawal are now common, they were not common at the time of the
founding. Indeed, it appears that the United States did not become a party
to a treaty containing a unilateral withdrawal clause until 1822.25
What international law did not address then, and still does not address,
is how treaty termination decisions are to be made internally by each nation.
For the United States, that internal issue is a matter of U.S. constitutional
law.
B.

Textual and Structural Considerations

Article II of the Constitution sets forth the process by which the United
States is to conclude treaties. It provides that the President “shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”26 The vast majority of
international agreements concluded by the United States in the modern era
do not go through this process and are instead concluded as “congressional–
executive agreements” (approved before or after the fact by a majority of
Congress) or “sole executive agreements” (approved solely by the
President).27 Nevertheless, some of the United States’ most significant
agreements are still concluded as Article II treaties. To take just a few
examples, the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were all concluded
1925) (1646); 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 1339–40
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); VATTEL, supra note 23,
§ 202; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) (“It is a part of the
law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one party, it is at the option of the other party, if
innocent, to declare, in consequence of the breach, that the treaty is void.”).
25. The treaty concerned the imposition of customs duties, and it provided that it was to
remain in force for two years “and even after the expiration of that term, until the conclusion of a
definitive treaty, or until one of the parties shall have declared its intention to renounce it; which
declaration shall be made at least six months before hand.” Convention of Navigation and
Commerce, U.S.–Fr., art. 7, June 24, 1822, 8 Stat. 278; see also Memorandum from William
Whittington, Termination of Treaties: International Rules and Internal United States Procedure 3
(Feb. 10, 1958) [hereinafter Whittington Memorandum] (on file with author) (noting that the 1822
treaty was the first treaty concluded by the United States containing a unilateral withdrawal
clause). The withdrawal clause was included at the request of France, which explained that, “As
their object is to make an experiment, it should be so established as not to press too heavily upon
whichever of the two parties may, on experience, be found to have erred in the calculation.”
Letter from G. Hyde de Neuville, Envoy Extraordinary, to John Quincy Adams, Sec’y of State
(May 15, 1822), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 210, 211 (Asbury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Wash.,
Gales & Seaton 1858).
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
27. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 74–75
(2013); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1287–88 (2008). The constitutional issues
implicated by the termination of executive agreements are potentially distinct from those
implicated by the termination of Article II treaties, and they are not considered here.
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through the senatorial advice and consent process. To the extent that the
United States ever becomes a party to treaties such as the Law of the Sea
Convention, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, it is expected that it will do so pursuant to the Article II process.28
The Constitution does not specifically address, however, the way in which
the United States is to go about terminating treaty commitments.
Some proponents of unilateral presidential authority to terminate
treaties rely on what has been referred to as the “Vesting Clause Thesis.”
According to this thesis, the first sentence of Article II of the Constitution,
which provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America,”29 conveys to the President all authority that
is “executive” in nature, regardless of whether that authority is specifically
mentioned in the remainder of Article II, unless the Constitution
specifically conveys that authority to another institutional actor.30 This
thesis supports a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties, it is
argued, because the termination of treaties is executive in nature and is not
specifically assigned to an actor other than the President.31 The Vesting
Clause Thesis, however, is highly controversial.32 Moreover, supporters of
this thesis vary in what authority they contend is conveyed by the clause.33
A variety of structural considerations are also potentially relevant to
determining who has the treaty termination power in the United States, but
these considerations do not point in a single direction. On the one hand, the
28. To the extent that presidents have proposed moving ahead with ratification of these
treaties, they have always suggested that the process would be the one set forth in Article II. For
the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, Congress has specifically mandated that it
can be ratified by the United States only through the Article II process. 22 U.S.C. § 7401(a)
(2012).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
30. For arguments in support of the thesis, see, for example, Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001), and
John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1677–78 (2002). See
also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 158 (2007)
(applying this thesis to the issue of treaty termination).
31. See RAMSEY, supra note 30.
32. For criticism of the thesis, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551 (2004), and
Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 263–64 (2009). See
also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“If [the Vesting Clause Thesis] be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers
bothered to add several specific items [in Article II], including some trifling ones.”).
33. For example, unlike Professors Prakash, Ramsey, and Yoo, Steven Calabresi and Kevin
Rhodes contend simply that “the Clause grants the President the power to supervise and control all
subordinate executive officials exercising executive power conferred explicitly by either the
Constitution or a valid statute,” and they do not make “the more ambitious (and far more doubtful)
claim” that it conveys substantive authority. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1177
n.119 (1992).
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making of treaties might be viewed as analogous to the appointment of
Executive Branch officers. Even though such appointment requires, as for
treaties, senatorial advice and consent (albeit a majority of the Senate rather
than two-thirds), it is well settled that presidents have some unilateral
authority to remove executive officers.34 On the other hand, the making of
treaties could be viewed as analogous to the making of federal statutes,
since both are part of the supreme law of the land. It is well settled that the
same process that applies to the making of federal statutes (approval by a
majority of both houses of Congress and presidential signature, or a
supermajority congressional override of a presidential veto) also must be
followed for the termination of federal statutes.35
Another structural consideration concerns Congress’s well-accepted
authority to override the domestic effect of a treaty by enacting a later-intime inconsistent statute.36 If that is all that Congress does, the
international-law status of the treaty will continue, and the United States
may end up in breach of its international obligations.37 The fact that
Congress has the authority to terminate the domestic effect of a treaty might
suggest that it also can have a role in terminating the treaty’s internationallaw effect, but the second power does not necessarily follow from the first.
Conversely, even if the President has the unilateral authority to terminate a
treaty internationally, it would not necessarily mean that he could (like
Congress) terminate its domestic effect without having validly terminated
its international-law effect. In fact, if treaties are part of the “Laws” that the
President is obligated under Article II of the Constitution to take care to

34. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146
(2010) (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep
[executive] officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.”).
35. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision
in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (“[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I.”).
36. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193–95 (1888);
see also La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) (“It has been
adjudged that Congress by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United States
are concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country and another country which had
been negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate.”).
37. See, e.g., Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291
U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (noting that although a federal statute that conflicted with a treaty provision
“would control in our courts as the later expression of our municipal law, . . . the international
obligation [would] remain[] unaffected”). Courts will attempt to construe statutes, however, to
avoid a treaty violation if possible. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A
treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such
purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”); see also BRADLEY, supra note 27,
at 54–55 (explaining reasons for this canon of construction).
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faithfully execute (as a number of scholars have concluded),38 it may be
constitutionally impermissible for the President to override the domestic
effect of a treaty that is otherwise still in force.
Still another structural consideration is the role of the Executive
Branch in communicating with foreign nations. The President has often
been described as the “sole organ” of formal communications between the
United States and the rest of the world, a role that is arguably implied from
both the unitary nature of the Executive Branch as well as the President’s
constitutional authority to make treaties and appoint and receive
ambassadors.39 To be sure, the phrase “sole organ” is an overstatement,
given that Congress often takes positions on matters of foreign policy and
that members of Congress regularly interact with foreign officials.40 But it
has always been the case that formal diplomatic functions are handled by
the Executive Branch.41 Because a termination of a treaty needs to be
communicated to the other treaty parties, the “sole organ” role of the
President may mean that neither Congress nor the Senate can effectuate by
themselves a treaty termination. This would not necessarily establish, of
course, that the President has unilateral authority to terminate a treaty.
After all, it is understood that no treaty can be ratified except through
presidential action,42 and yet the President is required to obtain the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate before engaging in such ratification.
The President’s “sole organ” authority might mean, however, that Congress
cannot validly require the President to terminate a treaty.
38. E.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound By the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 157–58 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1213, 1231–32 (2005); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). It is not clear whether treaties must be “selfexecuting” in order to qualify as “Laws” for this purpose.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (referring
to “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations”); see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)
(describing a statement by John Marshall, made when serving as a Representative in Congress,
that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations”); Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793),
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 38 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969)
(describing the Executive Branch as “the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign
Nations”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414, 414 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1997) (stating that the
President is the “only channel of communication” between the United States and foreign nations).
40. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2013)
(describing various forms of interactions between legislators and foreign nations and officials).
41. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 41–45
(2d ed. 1996) (describing the longstanding view of the Executive Branch as having exclusive
power to conduct diplomacy).
42. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 152 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter
CRS STUDY] (stating that a failure to ratify a treaty on the part of the President means that the
treaty “cannot enter into force for the United States”).
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Finally, it is conceivable that the President might have some
constitutional authority to suspend treaty obligations even if he or she did
not have constitutional authority to terminate the obligations. As noted, the
President has the obligation and authority to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”43 As part of his Take Care Clause responsibilities, the
President necessarily makes judgments (at least within certain limits) about
the levels of enforcement of federal law.44 It is arguable that this authority
encompasses the ability to direct a temporary suspension of U.S.
compliance with a treaty while a dispute concerning the treaty is addressed.
C.

Importance of Historical Practice

The historical practice of U.S. treaty termination is described in detail
in Parts II and III. As will be seen, when there has been debate over how
treaties can constitutionally be terminated, such as in Congress or the
courts, the debate has often focused on historical practice.45 Moreover,
Executive Branch lawyers have focused heavily on historical practice in
advising presidents and secretaries of state about their constitutional
authority concerning treaty termination.46 Scholars, too, have long
accorded historical practice a prominent place in the legal analysis of this
issue.47
Consider two modern controversies. In the 1970s, there was extensive
debate over the issue of treaty termination in the wake of President Carter’s
announcement that he was terminating a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan
in conjunction with his decision to recognize the People’s Republic of
China.48 The congressional hearings, scholarly commentary, and judicial
decisions relating to that controversy were all heavily focused on historical
practice.49 So was the Executive Branch’s reasoning: In a memorandum to

43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
44. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“The dynamic nature of
relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies
[under the immigration laws] are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these
and other realities.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“An agency generally
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency
is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper
ordering of its priorities.”); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”). There are
presumably limits on this enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (considering the scope of
the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion).
45. See infra Parts II–III.
46. See, e.g., infra subpart III(C) (describing how the State Department Legal Adviser relied
heavily on historical practice when advising the President that he had authority to terminate a
treaty with Taiwan).
47. See infra subparts II(E), III(E).
48. See infra subpart III(C).
49. See infra subpart III(C).

BRADLEY.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE)

784

Texas Law Review

3/24/2014 12:07 PM

[Vol. 92:773

the Secretary of State advising him that the President had the constitutional
authority to terminate the Taiwan treaty, for example, the Legal Adviser to
the State Department cited twelve purported instances in which presidents
had terminated treaties unilaterally and attached an appendix describing the
“History of Treaty Termination by the United States.”50
More recently, there was controversy in 2002 over President
George W. Bush’s announcement that he was unilaterally withdrawing the
United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia.51
Again, the Executive Branch relied extensively on historical practice. In
concluding that President Bush had the unilateral authority to suspend or
terminate the ABM Treaty, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel argued that “[t]he executive branch has long held the view that the
President has the constitutional authority to terminate treaties unilaterally,
and the legislative branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in
it.”52
There are a number of reasons why historical practice has played such
a prominent role in discussions of this issue. As a general matter,
arguments based on historical practice are a common feature of debates and
decisions relating to the constitutional separation of powers.53 This is
especially true in debates and decisions relating to the scope of presidential
power. Unlike the extensive list of powers granted to Congress, the text of
the Constitution says relatively little about the scope of presidential
authority.54 Responding in part to this limited textual guidance, Justice
Frankfurter emphasized the importance of historical practice to the
interpretation of presidential power in his concurrence in the Youngstown
steel seizure case. In his view, “[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of
American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution
and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”55

50. See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 252–58 and accompanying text.
52. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty,
Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Bellinger, III, Senior
Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat’l Sec. Council, Authority of the
President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty 15–16 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty
11152001.pdf.
53. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–24. Practice-based arguments are also common
in other areas of constitutional law, such as federalism. Invocations of practice in those areas raise
issues that are potentially distinct from the issues considered here. See id. at 416–17.
54. Id. at 417–18.
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (noting that
“‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution” (omission in
original) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘longcontinued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the
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When constitutional controversies implicate foreign relations,
invocations of historical practice are particularly common, in part because
of the lower level of judicial review in that area.56 For example, a frequent
argument in support of the constitutionality of “executive agreements” (that
is, binding international agreements concluded by the President without
obtaining the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate) is the fact that
presidents have long concluded such agreements.57 Similarly, debates over
the scope of the President’s authority to initiate the use of military force in
the absence of congressional authorization have been heavily informed by
past uses of force.58 Yet another example is the scope of the President’s
authority to determine which foreign governments are recognized by the
United States.59
Nevertheless, appeals to historical practice are not confined to matters
relating to foreign affairs. For example, the Supreme Court has emphasized
longstanding presidential practice when considering when the President’s
“pocket veto” (that is, failure to sign a bill before Congress recesses) should
be deemed to operate.60 Similarly, in concluding that the President’s pardon
power extended to a contempt of court conviction, the Court reasoned that
“long practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly
sustains the construction it is based on.”61 Moreover, as Trevor Morrison
and I have noted elsewhere, “arguments about the scope of both the
‘executive privilege’ (concerning the ability to withhold internal executive
branch communications from the other branches of government) and the
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR
CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 135 (1916) (“Executive power is sometimes created by
custom, and so strong is the influence of custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”).
56. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 420, 456.
57. See, e.g., Whether Uru. Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 232, 234 (1994) (“[P]ractice under the Constitution has established that the United States
can assume major international trade obligations such as those found in the Uruguay Round
Agreements when they are negotiated by the President and approved and implemented by Act of
Congress . . . .”); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 468–76 (describing the role of
historical practice in debates over the validity of congressional–executive agreements).
58. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–68 (describing the role of historical practice
in the war powers area). Compare, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C.
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (relying on
historical practice in support of the argument that President Obama had the unilateral authority to
initiate the use of military force in Libya), with Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”:
A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.F. 1, 3–4
(2011) (arguing that historical practice did not support the exercise of this authority).
59. For a recent example, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197,
207 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that longstanding post-ratification practice supports the
Secretary’s position that the President exclusively holds the recognition power.”).
60. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of
this character.”).
61. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925).
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‘legislative privilege’ (concerning, among other things, the internal powers
of the two houses of Congress) are commonly informed by historical
practice.”62
On these and other separation of powers issues, lawyers and judges
trained in the common law naturally look for precedent in evaluating legal
claims, and when judicial precedent is lacking, it is not surprising that they
turn to other forms of precedent.63 Executive Branch agencies such as the
Office of Legal Counsel also give weight to historical practice for reasons
somewhat akin to the reasons that courts give weight to their own prior
decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis, such as decisional efficiency
and the protection of reliance interests.64 Historical practice is particularly
likely to be invoked for separation of powers issues not specifically
addressed by the constitutional text,65 as is the case for treaty termination.
Among other things, when the implications of text are perceived to be
unclear, appeals to past practice allow for a type of principled reasoning
that might not otherwise be possible.66
To say that reliance on historical practice is unsurprising in this
context is not to say that it is normatively attractive, and some of the
tradeoffs associated with this sort of constitutional reasoning are explored
in Part IV. One particular difficulty with a practice-based approach to the
separation of powers is worth noting here: Most accounts of how historical
practice can inform constitutional interpretation in this context require that
the branch of government that is affected by a practice “acquiesce” in it
before it is credited.67 As Trevor Morrison and I have explained, however,

62. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 421; see also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S
PRIVILEGED FEW 3–19 (2007); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383,
1384–405 (1974).
63. For a general consideration of the role of nonjudicial precedent in constitutional law, see
Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008).
64. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1448 (2010).
65. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 455–56.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 1, at 134 (“[T]he branch placed on notice must have
acquiesced in the custom.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Focus: Foreign Affairs Under the United States
Constitution, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 n.7 (1988) (“Under the heading of ‘quasi-constitutional
custom,’ I would of course include executive practice of which Congress has approved or in
which it has acquiesced.”); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1338, 1356 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (“[T]he other branch must
have accepted or acquiesced in the action.”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional
War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 880 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) (“Congress . . . must not only be on notice of an
executive practice and accompanying claim of authority to act; it also must accept or acquiesce in
that practice and claim of authority.”); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680
(1981) (“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”).
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acquiescence is a problematic concept, especially as applied to Congress.68
Among other things, accounts of congressional acquiescence often assume
a “Madisonian” model of interbranch rivalry that probably does not
describe modern congressional–executive relations.69 A number of factors
contribute to the descriptive inaccuracy of this model, including the modern
party system, which reduces the incentives of individual members of
Congress to act systematically in constraining executive power or resisting
executive aggrandizement.70 If nothing else, the limitations with the
acquiescence concept suggest that there should be a high bar for claims of
congressional acquiescence and that greater attention should be paid to
potential indications of congressional nonacquiescence that fall short of the
enactment of contrary legislation, such as various forms of congressional
“soft law.”71
In theory, the courts could determine whether and to what extent the
historical practice relating to treaty termination should be credited. A
variety of justiciability limitations, however, make this unlikely. The
Supreme Court declined to resolve the dispute over the termination of the
Taiwan Treaty because of these limitations, with four Justices concluding
that the case presented a political question and Justice Powell concluding
that the case was not ripe for judicial review.72 Since that decision, the
Supreme Court has sharply limited the standing of members of Congress to
challenge presidential action.73 In 2002, a federal district court dismissed a
suit brought by thirty-two members of Congress challenging President
Bush’s termination of the ABM treaty, based on both a lack of standing and
the political question doctrine.74 For these reasons, it can be expected that
68. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432–47.
69. See id. at 438–47; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive
Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 671 (2011) (“[A]ll indications are
that political ‘ambition counteracting ambition’ has failed to serve as a self-enforcing safeguard
for the constitutional structures of federalism and separation of powers in the way that Madison
seems to have envisioned.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 865, 884 (2007) (“Whether or not this [Madisonian] picture was ever realistic, it is
no longer so today.”).
70. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
71. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 446, 450. For discussion of congressional soft
law, see generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012), and
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 573 (2008).
72. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997–1006 (1979).
73. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997) (holding that members of Congress
generally do not have standing to sue for injury to their institution absent a showing that their
votes have been “completely nullified”).
74. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Beacon Prods. Co. v.
Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (relying
on the political question doctrine to dismiss a challenge to a treaty termination by President
Reagan).
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historical practice will continue to develop relating to this issue and that
disputes will continue to be resolved outside the courts.
***
The next two Parts of this Article consider the historical practice of
U.S. treaty terminations.75 Part II shows that, at least until the late
nineteenth century, it was generally understood that presidents needed the
agreement of Congress or the Senate in order to terminate a treaty. Part III
describes the shift during the twentieth century towards unilateral
presidential termination of treaties. As will be seen, the shift did not
happen all at once but rather occurred over the course of decades as a result
of repeated claims and actions by the Executive Branch in the face of
congressional inaction. When a controversy finally did develop over this
question of institutional authority—in connection with President Carter’s
termination of the Taiwan treaty—the President was able to plausibly
maintain that his action was consistent with longstanding practice.
II.

Founding Through the Early Twentieth Century

This Part reviews the instances, during the period from the
constitutional founding through the early twentieth century, in which the
United States announced that it was terminating or suspending treaty
obligations. In doing so, it divides the practice into four categories:
● termination pursuant to ex ante congressional authorization or
directive;
● termination pursuant to senatorial authorization;
● termination with post hoc congressional or senatorial approval; and
● unilateral presidential termination.
The historical practice reviewed here includes instances in which the United
States ultimately decided not to terminate a treaty after announcing its
intention of doing so, on the theory that such instances can shed light on the
constitutional understandings of the President and Congress.76

75. For additional discussion of the historical practice, see DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 149–247 (1986); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL,
TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT §§ 178–186 (2d ed. 1916); 5 GREEN HAYWOOD
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 509 (1943). There is also extensive discussion
of the historical practice in the Senate hearings regarding President Carter’s termination of the
Taiwan treaty in subpart III(C) infra, as well as in the various State Department memoranda that
are referred to throughout this Article.
76. If, for example, a President initiates a unilateral termination and Congress does not object,
that would seem to be a relevant event even if the President decides to withdraw the termination
for policy reasons. The approach of this Article therefore differs from that of David Adler, who
suggests in his 1986 book on treaty termination that instances in which the termination was not
fulfilled are not relevant in discerning the constitutional practice of treaty termination. See
ADLER, supra note 75, at 164–65, 170, 184–85.
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Congressional Authorization or Directive

In the first instance in which the United States purported to terminate
treaties, Congress played an especially direct role. In 1798, on the eve of
war with France, Congress passed (and President Adams signed) legislation
stating that the four treaties the United States had at that time with France
“shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government
or citizens of the United States.”77 In the congressional debates over
whether to enact the statute, there does not appear to have been any doubt
about Congress’s constitutional authority to terminate the treaties. One
member of the House did observe that “[i]n most countries it is in the power
of the Chief Magistrate to suspend a treaty whenever he thinks proper,” but
he noted that “here Congress only has that power.”78 Several years later,
Thomas Jefferson referred to this episode in his Manual of Parliamentary
Practice, observing that “[t]reaties being declared, equally with the laws of
the U[nited] States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that
an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded.
This was accordingly the process adopted in the case of France in 1798.”79
Notwithstanding Jefferson’s contention that legislative action was the
exclusive method of terminating a treaty, the 1798 statute appears to be the
only instance in U.S. history in which the full Congress purported to
effectuate a termination directly. As noted in subpart I(B), it has generally
been understood that formal communications between the United States and
other nations are channeled through the Executive Branch. A possible
exception to that “sole organ” role for the Executive, however, is
Congress’s authority to declare war. A state of war was understood as
terminating certain types of treaty relationships, such as treaties of
alliance.80 So one way of understanding Congress’s termination of the

77. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, 578. Congress had already passed other warrelated measures by that point. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR 102 (1966)
(discussing a direct property tax enacted to pay for the expanded war program).
78. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2120 (1798). For additional discussion of the debate in Congress,
see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801,
at 250–53 (1997).
79. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 52 (Wash., Samuel
Harrison Smith 1801); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell, J.)
(suggesting that only Congress has the authority to terminate a treaty based on a violation by the
other party). Many years later, the U.S. Court of Claims held that the French treaties had been
validly terminated by Congress. See Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 418 (1887) (“The
treaties therefore ceased to be a part of the supreme law of the land . . . .”); see also Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 272 (1817) (assuming that the treaties had been terminated in
deciding a related property claim). During negotiations between the United States and France in
1800, however, France took the position that the U.S. treaty obligations had not been terminated
(although not because of any claim that Congress was unable to terminate treaties). 5 JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 774, at 357 (1906).
80. See, e.g., 2 VATTEL, supra note 23, bk. 3, § 175 (“Conventions and treaties are broken or
annulled when war breaks out between the contracting parties . . . .”).
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French treaties was as an exercise of its power to declare war (although
Congress merely authorized naval warfare against France and did not
formally declare war).81
In any event, without purporting directly to effectuate terminations,
Congress has authorized or directed presidential termination of treaties in a
number of other instances. In 1846, for example, Congress passed a joint
resolution authorizing President Polk “at his discretion” to terminate a
treaty with Great Britain relating to the two countries’ joint occupation of
the Oregon Territory.82 This resolution was issued in response to a request
from the President, in which he stated that a notice of termination would, in
his judgment, “be proper to give, and I recommend that provision be made
by law for giving it accordingly.”83 After Congress passed the resolution,
the Secretary of State informed the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain that
“Congress have spoken their will upon the subject, in their joint resolution;
and to this it is his (the President’s) and your duty to conform.”84 This was
apparently the first time that the United States attempted to terminate a
treaty pursuant to a unilateral withdrawal provision. Before the expiration
of the notice period, the United States and Great Britain negotiated a new
treaty to supersede the one that the United States had acted to terminate.
Prior to the issuance of the 1846 resolution, there was substantial
debate in Congress over whether it was proper for the House of
Representatives to be involved in the issue. During that debate, a majority
of those who spoke expressed the view that it was constitutionally proper
for the full Congress to authorize termination.85 Several members of the
House issued a minority report, however, arguing that, except when a treaty
is being terminated pursuant to a declaration of war, authorization of treaty
termination properly should come from a supermajority of the Senate, not
the full Congress.86 No one argued for a unilateral presidential power to
terminate.

81. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (noting that a declaration of war
“must be made by Congress, and . . . when made, usually suspends or destroys existing treaties
between the nations thus at war”); cf. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 41 (1800) (Washington, J.)
(concluding that France in 1799 qualified as an “enemy” within the meaning of a naval salvage
statute and noting that “[C]ongress had raised an army; stopped all intercourse with France;
dissolved our treaty; built and equipt ships of war; and commissioned private armed ships”).
82. Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, 109–10.
83. James K. Polk, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1845), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2235, 2245 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
84. S. DOC. NO. 29-489, at 15 (1st Sess. 1846).
85. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1846).
86. H.R. REP. NO. 29-34, at 1–3 (1984). Some senators also expressed this view. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 635 (1846) (statement of Sen. Mangum) (contending that
“[t]he power of treaty-making was one highly restricted by the Constitution—the Senate—twothirds of it—and the Executive possessed the power,” and, therefore, the Congress did not have
the power to make or break a treaty). For additional discussion of the debate in Congress, see
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Congress authorized additional treaty terminations in 1865 and 1874
without controversy.87 In 1876, President Grant informed Congress that
Great Britain was not complying with an extradition provision in a treaty,
and he stated that “[i]t is for the wisdom of Congress to determine whether
the article of the treaty relating to extradition is to be any longer regarded as
obligatory on the Government of the United States or as forming part of the
supreme law of the land.”88 In the meantime, he indicated that he would not
comply with extradition requests from Great Britain under the treaty
“without an expression of the wish of Congress that I should do so.”89
Extradition by the United States under the treaty was then suspended for six
months until the dispute with Great Britain was resolved.90
Sometimes Congress went beyond authorizing the President to
terminate treaties and affirmatively ordered him to do so. In 1883, for
example, Congress directed President Arthur to terminate various articles in
an 1871 treaty with Great Britain, and Arthur subsequently terminated the
articles.91 In 1915, Congress, in the Seaman’s Act, “requested and directed”
President Wilson to give notice of termination of various treaty obligations
inconsistent with the Act,92 and Wilson proceeded to do so.93
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829–
1861, at 78–80 (2005).
87. In 1865, Congress directed the President to terminate an 1854 Reciprocity Treaty with
Great Britain that concerned trade with Canada, and the Johnson Administration subsequently did
so. See Joint Resolution of Jan. 18, 1865, 13 Stat. 566; see also Letter from Charles Francis
Adams, Minister to the U.K., to William H. Seward, U.S. Sec’y of State (Mar. 23, 1865), in
PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, pt. 1, at 258 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1866); Letter
from William H. Seward, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Charles Francis Adams, Minister to the U.K.
(Jan. 18, 1865), in PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra, at 93. In 1874, Congress
authorized the President to terminate a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Belgium, and
President Grant immediately did so. See Joint Resolution of June 17, 1874, 18 Stat. 287; Letter
from Hamilton Fish, U.S. Sec’y of State, to J.R. Jones, Minister to Belgium (June 17, 1874), in
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (Wash., Gov’t
Printing Office 1874); see also Ulysses S. Grant, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1874), in 10 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 4238, 4242
(reporting that “[t]he notice directed by the resolution of Congress of June 17, 1874, to be given to
terminate the convention of July 17, 1858, between the United States and Belgium has been given,
and the treaty will accordingly terminate on the 1st day of July, 1875”).
88. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 20, 1876),
in 10 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at
4324, 4327.
89. Id.
90. CRANDALL, supra note 75, § 185, at 464.
91. Joint Resolution of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 641; Letter from Frederick T. Frelinghuysen,
U.S. Sec’y of State, to J.R. Lowell, Minister to the U.K. (Apr. 5, 1883), in PAPERS RELATING TO
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 413, 413–14 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office
1884).
92. Seaman’s Act, ch. 153, § 16, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184 (1915).
93. Circular from William Jennings Bryan, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Page (May 29,
1915), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1924). In
Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936), the Supreme Court upheld the
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At times, however, presidents argued that Congress could not
constitutionally compel them to take certain actions relating to a treaty. In
1879, for example, President Hayes vetoed an immigration bill on the
ground that it was trying to get him to partially terminate a treaty. In the
bill, Congress directed the President to terminate two provisions in a treaty
with China relating to Chinese immigration.94 In his veto message,
President Hayes conceded that Congress had the authority to terminate a
treaty, and in fact said that this was “free from controversy.”95 But he
pointed out that the bill called for the abrogation only of parts of a treaty
and argued that “the power of making new treaties or modifying existing
treaties is not lodged by the Constitution in Congress, but in the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”96
In 1920, President Wilson refused to implement a provision in the
Merchant Marine Act (also known as the Jones Act)97 that stated that he
was “authorized and directed” to terminate within ninety days various treaty
obligations that disallowed the United States from imposing discriminatory
customs duties and tonnage dues.98 The State Department issued a press
release explaining that, while the Act was seeking to have the President
partially terminate treaties, the treaties in question did not allow for such
partial termination.99 In explaining the proposed press release to the
Undersecretary of State, the Solicitor for the State Department cited
President Hayes’s reasoning in his veto of the Chinese immigration bill and
noted that although “Congress may pass an act violative of a treaty” and
“may express its sense that a treaty should be terminated,” it “cannot in
effect undertake legally to modify a treaty.”100 Not surprisingly, Wilson’s
termination of provisions in a treaty with Sweden and Norway pursuant to the directive in the
Seaman’s Act and noted that it was unnecessary in that case to address “the authority of the
Executive in the absence of congressional action, or of action by the treaty-making power, to
denounce a treaty of the United States.” Id. at 117.
94. An Act to Restrict the Immigration of Chinese to the United States, H.R. 2423, 45th Cong.
(1878).
95. Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of the Chinese Immigration Bill, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 45102, at 5 (3d Sess. 1879).
96. Id.
97. See Statement by State Department (Sept. 24, 1920), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8871, 8871–72 (1927).
98. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, ch. 250, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920).
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with author); see also
President Won’t Denounce Treaties; Defies Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1920,
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00F10FC345511738DDDAC0A94D
1405B808EF1D3 (reporting on the State Department’s issuance of a press release explaining the
President’s refusal to implement the Act to the extent it would entail the illegal termination of
treaty obligations).
100. Memorandum from the Solicitor of the Dep’t of State to Norman H. Davis, U.S.
Undersecretary of State 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1920) (on file with author). The Office of the Solicitor was
the chief legal advisor to the State Department from 1891 to 1931 and was based within the
Department of Justice. Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks, The State Department Legal Adviser’s
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refusal to implement this portion of the statute, after having signed the
statute into law, generated controversy.101
The next year, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes advised
President Harding that a partial termination like the one contemplated by
Congress in the Jones Act was not permissible under international law. “As
the existing treaties do not permit such partial termination by notice,”
explained Hughes, “it follows that Congress has failed to give a mandate on
which the President can act.”102 There was no suggestion, however, that
Congress could not direct the President to terminate a treaty in its entirety.
B.

Senatorial Authorization

The President has occasionally terminated a treaty based on prior
authorization solely from the Senate. In 1855, the Senate issued a
resolution authorizing the President to terminate a Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation Treaty with Denmark, after President Pierce had indicated
that he thought termination was warranted.103 In announcing the U.S.
termination, President Pierce noted that he was acting “[i]n pursuance of the
authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate.”104
The following year, the Senate debated whether it could properly act in
this manner without the involvement of the House of Representatives.
Senator Charles Sumner argued that, because a treaty is part of the supreme
law of the land, it should only be repealed through action of the full
legislature.105 The Senate asked the Foreign Relations Committee to
consider the issue, and the Committee prepared a report on the subject. It
concluded that termination pursuant to senatorial authorization was
constitutionally proper, at least where, as here, the treaty specifically

Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1750 (2012). It was replaced in
1931 by the Office of the Legal Adviser, which is based in the State Department. Id.
101. See Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J. INT’L L.
33, 33–34, 37–38 (1921).
102. Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Hughes, U.S. Sec’y of State, for President Harding
30 (Oct. 8, 1921) (on file with author).
103. See Franklin Pierce, Second Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1854), in 7 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 2806, 2812 (stating that “I
deem it expedient that the contemplated notice should be given to the Government of Denmark”).
104. Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 2860, 2867. Some years earlier,
Secretary of State James Buchanan had informed Denmark that, in order for the United States to
withdraw from the treaty, “an Act must first pass Congress to enable the President to give the
required notice.” Letter from James Buchanan, Sec’y of State, to Robert P. Flenniken, Minister to
Den. (Oct. 14, 1848), in 8 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, 220, 224 (John Bassett Moore ed.,
1909).
105. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1856) (statement of Sen. Sumner). Sumner,
an ardent abolitionist, was apparently concerned that the pro-Southern Senate would seek to
terminate a provision in the 1842 Webster–Ashburton Treaty that required patrols off the coast of
Africa to suppress the slave trade. Reeves, supra note 101, at 35.
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allowed for unilateral withdrawal. The Committee observed that, “so far as
the ‘practice of the government’ is concerned, there is nothing to question
the sufficiency of the notice that has been given to Denmark to terminate
the treaty.”106 It appears that the only other instance of senatorial (as
opposed to full congressional) involvement in a treaty termination occurred
in 1921, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to U.S. termination of
the International Sanitary Convention, based on a request from President
Wilson.107
C.

Ex Post Congressional or Senatorial Approval

Sometimes the President has acted to terminate a treaty and obtained
subsequent approval from either the full Congress or the Senate. In 1864,
for example, President Lincoln gave notice of termination of the Great
Lakes Agreement with Great Britain (also known as the Rush–Bagot
Agreement), which limited the naval military presence of the United States
on the Lakes, pursuant to a six-months’ notice provision in the
Agreement.108 Congress subsequently passed a joint resolution (which
Lincoln signed) “adopt[ing] and ratif[ying]” the termination “as if the same
had been authorized by [C]ongress.”109 In the debate on this resolution,
Senator Davis objected that Congress was creating a “mischievous
precedent. . . . which is to sanction and to give authority to an unauthorized
act by the President.”110 Other senators agreed that Congress needed to
approve the termination but thought that Congress could do so
retroactively.111 Despite the Senate’s action, the President decided to

106. S. REP. NO. 34-97, at 7–8 (1st Sess. 1856). Senator Sumner (and other Senators)
continued to dispute the point. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1147 (1856). For additional
discussion of the debate in Congress, see CURRIE, supra note 86, at 80–84. A resolution was
proposed in the Senate that would have confirmed the validity of the Senate’s action, but it was
never voted on. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 826 (1856).
107. S. Res. of May 26, 1921, 67th Cong., 61 CONG. REC. 1793; see also 61 CONG. REC.
1793–94 (1921) (providing the text of both President Wilson’s request for the Senate’s advice and
consent to terminate the treaty and the Senate resolution providing this authorization). For another
reference to the idea of senatorial involvement in treaty termination, see Techt v. Hughes, 128
N.E. 185, 192 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.), where the court found a treaty with the AustroHungarian Empire to still be in effect despite World War I and observed that the “President and
senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life,” a statement that was quoted by the
Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947).
108. See Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1864), in 8 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 83, at 3444, 3447. Lincoln was
responding to Confederate raids from Canada. See id.
109. Joint Resolution of Feb. 9, 1865, 13 Stat. 568.
110. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1865); see also id. at 313 (Sen. Davis) (“[I]t is
indispensably incumbent and necessary, in order to secure the termination of this treaty, that it
shall be terminated not by the action of the President, but by the action of Congress.”).
111. See, e.g., id. at 313 (Sen. Sumner); id. at 314–15 (Sen. Johnson).
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rescind the notice of termination after further negotiations with Great
Britain, so it never took effect.112
Another example is President Taft’s action in 1911, when he gave
notice to Russia of a termination of a commercial treaty. In response to
Russia’s mistreatment of American Jews, the House of Representatives had
passed a strongly worded resolution demanding termination of the treaty
(on a vote of 301 to 1),113 and the resolution was thought likely to pass in
the Senate.114 Taft, who had been reluctant to terminate the treaty at all,
was concerned that the harsh tone of the House resolution would needlessly
offend Russia.115 He therefore quickly communicated his own statement of
termination to Russia and submitted that statement to the Senate “with a
view to its ratification and approval.”116 The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee proposed a joint resolution stating that the notice of termination
was “adopted and ratified,” and this resolution was subsequently passed by
both houses of Congress (with the vote in the Senate being unanimous) and
was signed by the President.117 The discussion in Congress primarily
concerned whether the Senate or the full Congress should be involved in
approving the termination, not whether the President had a unilateral power
of termination.118
112. ADLER, supra note 75, at 164–65.
113. See 48 CONG. REC. 353 (1911). In the deliberations on this resolution in the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the prominent constitutional lawyer Louis Marshall testified that
the proper procedure for terminating a treaty was by joint resolution of Congress. He noted that
he initially “had an idea that the executive department had ample power to deal with the matter,”
but, after studying the historical practice, he had reached the conclusion “that the power rests in
Congress.” Termination of the Treaty of 1832 Between the United States and Russia: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 62d Cong. 42 (1911) (statement of Louis Marshall). In
his testimony, Marshall presented Congress with a memorandum (prepared by Herbert
Friedenwald, Secretary of the American Jewish Committee) describing the past practice of treaty
terminations, which was reprinted as an appendix to the committee hearings. See id. at 49, app. III
at 295.
114. ADLER, supra note 75, at 181.
115. Id. at 182.
116. 48 CONG. REC. 453 (1911); see also Taft Himself May End Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1911,
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70D11FA395517738DDDA10994
DA415B818DF1D3 (discussing the likelihood of Taft denouncing the Russian treaty and asking
only for the Senate’s approval, thereby avoiding presidential approbation of the harsh statement in
the House).
117. See Joint Resolution of Dec. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627 (1911); 48 CONG. REC. 507 (1911)
(recording the Senate vote); id. at 600 (documenting the fact that the President had signed the
resolution).
118. See 48 CONG. REC. 484 (statement of Senator Stone noting that the issue was whether the
termination should be accomplished “with the joint sanction of the two Houses of Congress or
whether it should be taken by the President with the approval of the Senate alone”). Compare,
e.g., id. at 473 (statement of Senator Rayner that “[a] treaty is the supreme law of the land under
the language of the Constitution, and the supreme law of the land ought not to be set aside except
by legislative action of both Houses”), with id. at 479 (statement of Senator Lodge that “in cases
where treaties have involved no legislation the power of the Senate and the President to terminate
a treaty by notice, or to arrest its operation . . . is absolute, because in making such a treaty the
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Both of these episodes are obviously closer to presidential
unilateralism than situations in which the President obtains advance
authorization for a treaty termination. Lincoln’s action was controversial
for that reason.119 The Taft episode was less controversial because it was
obvious when Taft acted that Congress supported termination of the treaty
and was in fact the driving force behind the decision to terminate, and the
only issue was over how the message would be conveyed to Russia. It is
also worth noting that, when writing some years later about presidential
power, Taft made clear that he thought that “[t]he President may not annul
or abrogate a treaty without the consent of the Senate unless he is given that
specific authority by the terms of the treaty.”120
D.

Unilateral Presidential Termination

In modern debates, the Executive Branch has sometimes claimed that
the first unilateral presidential termination of a treaty occurred in 1815,121
but that is erroneous. The Madison administration observed that year that a
treaty with The Netherlands, which had been concluded in 1782, had been
“annulled” in light of the fact that The Netherlands had in the meantime
been assimilated into the French Empire of Napoleon and then
reconstructed in the Congress of Vienna.122 The observation occurred in
response to a suggestion by The Netherlands that the two countries
conclude a new treaty based on the terms of the old one, a suggestion that
itself assumed that the old treaty was no longer in force.123 Under

Senate and the President represent the high contracting party”). Some members of the House of
Representatives cited historical practice in support of the proposition that the full Congress could
terminate a treaty. See, e.g., id. at 319 (statement of Rep. Legare) (citing treaties that Congress
had terminated in the past); id. at 331 (statement of Rep. Peters) (referring to past treaties
abrogated by Congress).
119. The Rush–Bagot Agreement that Lincoln had proposed terminating was originally
concluded by President Monroe unilaterally based on his Commander in Chief authority, although
it eventually received senatorial advice and consent. See BRADLEY, supra note 27, at 90. As a
result, it may have been viewed as occupying an uncertain place between sole executive
agreements (which indisputably can be terminated unilaterally by the President) and Article II
treaties.
120. TAFT, supra note 55, at 115–16.
121. See, e.g., Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to
Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Sec’y of State, President’s Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.–
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978) [hereinafter Hansel Memorandum], in S. COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ALLOCATION OF POWER 395, 397 (Comm. Print 1978) (“In 1815, President Madison exchanged
correspondence with the Netherlands which has been construed by the United States as
establishing that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the two countries had been
annulled.”).
122. See CRANDALL, supra note 75, § 179, at 429 (“The state thus formed, although in
general considered the successor to, differed in name, territory, and form of government from, the
state which had entered into the treaty of October 8, 1782 with the United States.”).
123. Id.
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international law at that time, a treaty imposing reciprocal obligations
became void if one of the parties ceased to exist—for example, if it was
conquered by another nation.124 The United States, therefore, did not
terminate this treaty.
There is an even earlier episode that, although it did not involve any
announced treaty termination, is sometimes cited in support of a unilateral
presidential authority to suspend or terminate treaties.125 In 1793, there was
a debate within George Washington’s cabinet over whether to receive an
ambassador from revolutionary France with, or without, qualifications.126
Receiving him without qualifications might signal that the United States
accepted the continuing effect of the treaties it had with France, including a
treaty of alliance, notwithstanding the changes in France’s government.127
Receiving him with qualifications, by contrast, might allow the United
States the option of suspending or terminating the treaties.128 Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton and Secretary of War Henry Knox
thought the ambassador should be received with qualifications, whereas
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund
Randolph thought he should be received without qualifications.129 The
cabinet members prepared memoranda focused on whether international
law allowed for suspension or termination of the treaties under these
circumstances.130
Ultimately, Washington decided to receive the ambassador without
qualifications, so there was no effort to reserve the option of suspending or

124. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 23, § 203 (noting that a treaty comes to an end “if, for any
cause whatever, the Nation should lose its character as an independent political society”); see also
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (London, Cary, Lea & Blanchard
1836) (“Treaties . . . expire of course:—1. In case either of the contracting parties loses its
existence as an independent State.”).
125. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 30, at 324–26 (arguing that President Washington’s
belief that he could renounce the treaties with France suggests that people during this period
believed that the President had the power to terminate or suspend treaties); Yoo & Delahunty
Memorandum, supra note 52, at 15–16 (citing Hamilton and Knox’s recommendation to
Washington that he consider suspending the French treaty as evidence of a general understanding
that the President had unilateral authority to suspend treaties).
126. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 32–33 (2006) (describing the debate); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 339–41
(1993) (same).
127. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 32, at 667.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 667–68.
130. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington
(May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 367, 367–96 (Harold C. Syrett et al.
eds., 1969) (arguing that the United States could choose to suspend or even renounce the treaties
with France); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 607, 607–18 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that the
United States should not renounce the French treaties).
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terminating the treaties.131 The cabinet members did not discuss in their
memoranda whether it was proper as a matter of U.S. constitutional law for
the President to suspend or terminate treaties unilaterally. Their silence
might suggest that they assumed that the President had this authority,
especially since they decided not to call Congress into special session, but
this is reading a lot into mere silence.132 In a related context, Alexander
Hamilton did take the position that the President had the authority to
suspend a treaty in response to a revolutionary change in the government of
the other treaty party, but James Madison (whose views in this period were
similar to Jefferson’s) sharply disputed Hamilton’s claim.133 In any event,
the Executive Branch never made any public claim of a unilateral
suspension or termination authority, so there was no opportunity to find out
Congress’s views on the matter, and certainly no circumstance for crediting
any sort of congressional acquiescence. Finally, when the United States did
take action five years later to terminate the French treaties, it did so, as
noted above, by congressional resolution, not unilateral executive action.134
The first instance in which a President actually proceeded to terminate
treaty provisions without even after-the-fact congressional or senatorial
approval appears to have been in 1899, when the McKinley Administration
terminated certain clauses in an 1850 commercial treaty with
Switzerland.135 McKinley did not terminate the entire treaty, and in fact
some provisions in the treaty remain in effect even today.136 In addition,
McKinley’s action need not be viewed as purely unilateral, given that he
131. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 32, at 669.
132. Cf. CURRIE, supra note 78, at 182 n.63 (noting that Washington’s decision “avoid[ed]
the difficult constitutional question whether the President alone could terminate a treaty”).
133. Compare Hamilton, supra note 39, at 42 (“Hence in the case stated, though treaties can
only be made by the President and Senate, their activity may be continued or suspended by the
President alone.”), with James Madison, “Helvidius” Number 3 (Sept. 7, 1793), reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 95, 99 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) (“Nor can [the
President] have any more right to suspend the operation of a treaty in force as a law, than to
suspend the operation of any other law.”). More than two years earlier, Madison had suggested in
a letter that the termination of a treaty in response to a breach by the other party required either
congressional or senatorial approval. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton
(Jan. 2, 1791), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 342, 344 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
1981) (stating that the Constitution requires that only the Legislature can terminate a “Treaty of
peace” (emphasis omitted)).
134. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
135. See Letter from John Hay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Leishman (Mar. 8, 1899),
in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 753, 753–54 (1901);
see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 661 (1937) (observing
that “there seems to be at least one instance where the President alone without cooperation of
Senate or Congress has terminated certain treaty provisions, i.e., in the case of a treaty with
Switzerland”).
136. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2012, at 266,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202293.pdf.
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was responding to a potential conflict between the treaty and a federal
statute. The Tariff Act of 1897 had authorized the President to negotiate
reciprocal trade agreements,137 and, pursuant to the Act, the United States
had concluded such an agreement with France.138 Switzerland contended
that it was automatically entitled to the benefit of the concessions granted to
France because of most-favored-nation provisions in the 1850 treaty.139 But
granting it such concessions, without obtaining in return concessions
similar to the ones given by the French, would have been contrary to
longstanding U.S. trade policy, including the policy of Congress reflected in
the Tariff Act.140
E.

Early Scholarly Commentary

The only treaties that the United States terminated in the early years of
its history were the French treaties, and that termination was related to the
imminent state of hostilities between the two countries. Moreover, early
U.S. treaties did not contain clauses allowing for discretionary
withdrawal,141 so that scenario likely would not have been considered.
Perhaps for these reasons, constitutional law treatises in the early part of the
nineteenth century have little if any discussion of treaty termination.
Thomas Sergeant’s 1822 treatise on constitutional law did note, however,
that “[i]t seems, the authority to declare a treaty to have been violated, and
to be therefore void, belongs only to Congress; the judiciary cannot exercise
it.”142 And William Rawle’s constitutional law treatise, published in 1825,
tied a congressional power to terminate treaties to Congress’s power to
declare war.143 Similarly, Joseph Story stated in his 1833 Commentaries on
the Constitution that “it will not be disputed, that [treaties] are subject to the
legislative power, and may be repealed, like other laws, at its pleasure.”144
As discussed in the next Part, it appears that the first scholar to suggest
a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties was Westel
137. Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203 (repealed 1909).
138. ADLER, supra note 75, at 165.
139. Id.
140. For the exchange of correspondence between Switzerland and the United States about
this issue, see PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 135, at 740–57.
141. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
142. THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403 (Phila., Abraham Small 1822).
143. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 68 (Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829) (“Congress alone possesses the right to
declare war; and the right to qualify, alter, or annul a treaty being of a tendency to produce war, is
an incident to the right of declaring war.”); see also WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF
LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (N.Y.C.,
Harper & Bros. 1843) (“[T]he power in question may be regarded as an incident to that of
declaring war.”).
144. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1832, at 695 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
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Willoughby, a political science professor at Johns Hopkins, in his 1910
treatise on U.S. constitutional law.145
***
Historical practice through at least the late nineteenth century suggests
an understanding that congressional or senatorial approval was
constitutionally required for the termination of U.S. treaties. Not only was
Congress or the Senate almost always involved in treaty terminations, but
presidents generally acted as if they needed such involvement. The chief
debate was simply over whether the full Congress or merely the Senate
should be involved in treaty terminations, and historical practice was
viewed as relevant to that debate. Lincoln’s initially unilateral action in
1864 was potentially contrary to this understanding, but it was an outlier
and generated constitutional criticism in Congress rather than acquiescence.
Grant’s action in 1876 might have suggested some unilateral authority to
suspend a treaty obligation, but this action was embedded within an
acknowledgment of the need for congressional approval of termination. It
was not until McKinley’s action with respect to the Swiss treaty in 1899
that there was anything resembling a clear precedent for a unilateral
presidential termination authority, and that action involved only a partial
termination and was arguably part of an effort to implement congressional
policy. Moreover, at least before the 1899 termination, the Executive
Branch made no claim of a unilateral termination authority. For example,
in the digests of international practice prepared by the Executive Branch in
the late nineteenth century, the materials quoted relating to treaty
termination referred only to termination by Congress.146
This historical account presents difficulties for scholars who have
attempted to defend a presidential power over treaty termination on
originalist grounds, such as under the Vesting Clause Thesis (which
hypothesizes that the vesting clause of Article II of the Constitution
implicitly conveys to the President authority not otherwise listed in
Article II).147 There is no direct evidence that the Founders understood that
the Constitution was granting the President a unilateral power of treaty
termination. Moreover, to the extent that originalists credit historical
practice, they typically place much more emphasis on early practice than

145. See infra subpart III(E).
146. See, e.g., JOHN L. CADWALADER, DIGEST OF THE PUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, AND OF THE LEADING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS WITH
REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, TREATIES, AND KINDRED SUBJECTS §§ 48–50, at 234 (rev.
ed. 1877) (discussing the principles of treaty abrogation but making no mention of abrogation by
the Executive Branch); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 137(a), at 58–65 (2d ed. 1887) (same); see also David A. Schnitzer, Note, Into
Justice Jackson’s Twilight: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Treaty Termination, 101
GEO. L.J. 243, 265–66 (2012) (surveying period digests’ treatment of treaty abrogation).
147. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
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modern practice, on the theory that it is closer in time to the founding and,
thus, either is more likely to reflect founding intent or is a “liquidation” of
issues unsettled at the founding.148 Yet the first century of U.S. practice
weighs strongly against a unilateral presidential power of treaty
termination. If the Article II Vesting Clause conveyed to presidents the
unilateral authority to terminate treaties, it is surprising that no one (with
the possible exception of Alexander Hamilton) seemed to be aware of it for
a hundred years.
III. Twentieth-Century Shift to Presidential Unilateralism
This Part describes the shift in U.S. practice during the twentieth
century towards unilateral presidential termination of treaties. The
accretion of claims and practice relating to this issue occurred over a long
period, running from Congress’s protectionist trade policy of the early
twentieth century, to the U.S. rejection of the Versailles Treaty after World
War I, to the onset of World War II and the related rise of the United States
as a superpower. Although there was significant controversy surrounding
the issue in connection with President Carter’s announcement in 1978 that
he was unilaterally terminating a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, the
Executive Branch prevailed in that dispute, and unilateral presidential
termination of treaties has since become the norm. In addition to
considering publicly available materials such as congressional hearings,
official correspondence, and presidential proclamations, the description in
this Part takes account of a number of internal memoranda prepared by the
legal office for the State Department during the first half of the twentieth
century, which have been retrieved from the State Department archives.149
A.

Seeds of Change

The stirrings of a shift to presidential unilateralism can be seen in the
early years of the twentieth century. In 1909, at the outset of the Taft
Administration, the Solicitor for the State Department wrote an internal
memorandum suggesting that it was constitutionally permissible for the
President to act unilaterally in terminating a treaty. The memorandum
stated that, although presidential action pursuant to a congressional

148. Some originalists accept that the Founders allowed certain unresolved constitutional
issues to be worked out, or “liquidated,” by early practice and decisions. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 547–53 (2003). This
liquidation idea was famously articulated by James Madison in The Federalist Papers. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the
meaning of the Constitution, like that of all laws, would be “liquidated and ascertained by a series
of particular discussions and adjudications” (emphasis omitted)).
149. Some of these memoranda have been partially excerpted in digests of practice published
by the U.S. State Department. See, e.g., HACKWORTH, supra note 75, § 509, at 319 (containing
such an excerpt).
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directive might be the “most effective and unquestionable method” for
terminating a treaty, the President also had the option under U.S. law either
of acting in conjunction with the Senate or through “notice given by the
President upon his own initiative without either a resolution of the Senate or
the joint resolution of the Congress.”150 In support of the last option, the
memorandum noted that there had been one instance of unilateral
presidential termination of a treaty, namely the 1899 termination of the
provisions in the Swiss treaty.151 The memorandum concluded that the
choice of which method to use for terminating a treaty “would seem to
depend either upon the importance of the international question or upon the
preference of the Executive.”152 As discussed above, two years later the
Taft Administration moved to terminate a treaty with Russia as a result of
Russia’s mistreatment of American Jews,153 and it seems likely that this
memorandum was prepared in connection with the Administration’s initial
consideration of that issue.154
A few years later, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest in dicta that
the Executive Branch could decide whether to stop complying with a
bilateral treaty in response to a breach by the other party. In Charlton v.
Kelly,155 the Court concluded that it was not improper for the Executive
Branch to extradite a U.S. citizen to Italy pursuant to an extradition treaty
between the two countries, notwithstanding the fact that Italy had declined
to extradite its own citizens to the United States.156 “The executive
department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the
obligation to deliver up its own citizens,” the Court reasoned, “it is the plain
duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender the appellant as
one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of the land and as affording
authority for the warrant of extradition.”157 It is not clear how much should
be read into such dicta, but it is worth recalling that there was the

150. Memorandum from James Brown Scott, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to President
Wilson 1–2 (June 12, 1909) (on file with author).
151. See id. at 2.
152. Id. at 3.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 113–18.
154. The memorandum was prepared in June 1909. The American Jewish Committee was in
communication with the Administration about the Russian issue during this time period, and
members of the Committee met with Taft during the summer of 1909. See Naomi W. Cohen, The
Abrogation of the Russo-American Treaty of 1832, 25 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 3, 9–10 (1963)
(describing how Committee members Judge Sulzberger and Dr. Cyrus Adler met with Taft, the
Secretary of State, and the American ambassador to Russia in the summer of 1909 and advocated
for abrogation); Clifford L. Egan, Pressure Groups, the Department of State, and the Abrogation
of the Russian–American Treaty of 1832, 115 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 328, 329–30 (1971)
(describing Taft’s interaction with the American Jewish Committee in 1909 and 1910).
155. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
156. Id. at 475–76.
157. Id. at 476.
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nineteenth-century precedent of President Grant in effect suspending
extradition until an issue of treaty compliance could be worked out.158
The topic of treaty termination arose again in 1919, during the debate
in the Senate over whether to give its advice and consent to the Versailles
Treaty, which, among other things, established the League of Nations. The
League of Nations Covenant had a provision allowing any member to
withdraw after two years “provided that all its international obligations and
all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time
of its withdrawal.”159 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican leader in
the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed
attaching a reservation to the Senate’s advice and consent providing that the
United States could withdraw from the Covenant through enactment of a
concurrent resolution by Congress.160 This proposal generated substantial
discussion.
Noting that a concurrent resolution does not require the agreement of
the President, Senator Thomas moved to delete the concurrent resolution
clause from the reservation on the ground that withdrawal from a treaty was
“an executive and not a legislative function.”161 In the debate on the
motion, Senator Jones asked “whether or not the President could give such
notice [of termination] without authorization from Congress.”162 Senator
Walsh replied, “I think not; clearly not. I cannot believe that anybody could
entertain any serious doubt as to that.”163 In arguing in favor of the
concurrent resolution clause, however, Senator Spencer contended that the
President could unilaterally withdraw the United States from the treaty and
thus the concurrent resolution clause was simply adding another option for
U.S. withdrawal.164
Numerous senators, however, either expressly
disagreed with Spencer’s premise or expressed skepticism about it.165

158. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
159. League of Nations Covenant art. 1, para. 3.
160. 58 CONG. REC. 8074 (1919). Lodge had significant concerns about the League of
Nations Covenant, especially Article Ten, which involved a precommitment by the members to
use military force in response to aggression. He led a group of Republicans that insisted that the
Senate include a package of reservations with its advice and consent to the Covenant. Although
there was majority support in the Senate for Lodge’s proposed approach, neither his proposal nor
a Democratic proposal to have the Senate give its advice and consent without the reservations was
able to garner the required two-thirds vote. See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE
HEART OF THE WORLD: WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 234–
375 (2001).
161. 58 CONG. REC. 8074 (1919).
162. Id. at 8076.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 8121–22.
165. See, e.g., id. (Sen. Brandegee) (challenging Spencer’s premise that the President could
withdraw the United States from the League of Nations unilaterally without the consent of
Congress); id. at 8122 (Sen. Poindexter) (asking Spencer how the President can unilaterally repeal
treaties if they are the supreme law of the land); id. (Sen. Thomas) (expressing skepticism of
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In one of the more extensive analyses of the issue, Senator Robinson
explained:
While the authorities on the subject are somewhat confusing, and
while the Senate precedents, as in almost every disputed case, are
somewhat conflicting, I believe that I can successfully maintain that
the proper, the constitutional, the customary method of giving such
notice as is contemplated in the reservation is through some action
which contemplates the concurrence of the Executive and the two
Houses of Congress.166
Robinson subsequently noted, however, that “[t]here may be cases . . .
where the Executive alone[] has the authority to terminate a treaty, but these
cases are exceptional.”167
Nevertheless, the views on this question were mixed. Senator Lenroot
later pointed out that Westel Willoughby’s 1910 constitutional law treatise
stated that the President had a unilateral withdrawal power.168 This seemed
to cause Senator Walsh to retreat to some extent from his earlier statement
to the contrary, while noting that he would “want to examine the question
with very great care before [he] could accept any such doctrine [as argued
by Willoughby].”169 Senator King then asked Senator Lenroot whether, if
Willoughby were correct, there was any way that the Senate could protect
itself against a President unilaterally terminating a treaty that the Senate had
agreed to, and Lenroot responded that the courts would likely treat the
matter as a political question, so the principal tool of Congress would
probably be impeachment.170 Lenroot further noted, in response to another
question from King, that the Senate could prospectively limit the
President’s termination authority by including a provision to that effect in
its advice and consent to a treaty.171 There was also some discussion of
whether Taft’s termination in 1911 of the treaty with Russia was precedent
for a unilateral termination authority, and Lenroot expressed the view that it
was.172 Ultimately, the proposed amendment to the reservation was

Spencer’s interpretation of the League of Nations article requiring “member” to be equivalent to
“President” and that the President has unilateral authority to repeal treaties as supreme laws of the
land under the treaty-making power); id. at 8124 (Sen. Robinson) (expressing doubt that the
Executive Branch can terminate a treaty without involving Congress unless perhaps the treaty
relates to functions exclusively within the Executive’s power).
166. Id. at 8124.
167. Id. at 8125.
168. Id. at 8129, 8132.
169. Id. at 8131; see also id. at 8130 (responding that he did “not undertake to say . . . whether
the actual concurrence” of the President and Congress for withdrawal is “essential”).
170. Id. at 8132.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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rejected. Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted against giving its advice and
consent to the treaty even with the reservations.173
The termination issue does not appear to have been settled. In the next
session of Congress, the Senate reconsidered its rejection of the treaty.174
During that discussion, Senator Lodge moved to amend his proposed
reservation to make clear that the United States could withdraw either by
two houses of Congress or by presidential action.175 Lodge explained that
the usual method of terminating treaties had been pursuant to congressional
direction or concurrence, but he noted that there were two instances in
which presidents had acted unilaterally—McKinley in 1889 and Taft in
1911.176 When asked whether the President would have the authority to
withdraw the United States from the Versailles Treaty even if this authority
were not specified in the reservation, Lodge replied (somewhat awkwardly)
that, “I think it is at least doubtful whether the President has not the power
to do that.”177 The ensuing debate on his motion, however, concerned
whether the Senate could delegate termination authority to the President,
not whether he had such authority independently.178 In any event, Lodge’s
amendment was rejected,179 and the original language of his proposed
reservation was retained.180 The Senate then proceeded to reject the
Versailles Treaty a second time.181
Despite these various discussions of treaty termination, no President
actually terminated a treaty unilaterally during the twentieth century until
1927. In that year, the Coolidge Administration withdrew the United States
from a smuggling convention with Mexico without authorization or
subsequent approval from Congress or the Senate.182 The administration
explained that the United States had no commercial treaty with Mexico and
that
it is not deemed advisable to continue in effect an arrangement which
might in certain contingencies bind the United States to cooperation
for the enforcement of laws or decrees relating to the importation of
commodities of all sorts into another country with which this

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id. at 8803.
59 CONG. REC. 3229 (1920).
Id. at 3229–30.
Id.
Id. at 3230.
Id. at 3230–32.
Id. at 3242.
Id.
Id. at 4599.
ADLER, supra note 75, at 183–84.
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Government has no arrangement, by treaty or otherwise,
safeguarding American commerce against possible discrimination.183
This action was taken after extensive concerns had been raised in Congress
about Mexico’s confiscation of American property.184
Unilateral presidential terminations subsequently became more
common in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, although some of
these terminations, like McKinley’s 1899 termination of provisions in the
Swiss treaty, were because of potential conflicts with trade legislation. In
1933, the Executive Branch withdrew the United States from a convention
abolishing import and export restrictions, without authorization or
subsequent approval from Congress or the Senate, because of (among other
things) alleged conflicts between the convention and the new National
Industrial Recovery Act.185 Also in 1933, Roosevelt unilaterally announced
termination of an extradition treaty with Greece because of its purported
breach of the treaty after Greece had refused to extradite Samuel Insull, a
billionaire tycoon who was accused of financial misdealings.186 After
Greece forced Insull to leave the country and a protocol to the extradition
183. Telegram from Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Sheffield (Mar.
21, 1927), in 3 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1927, at
230, 230–31 (1942). The Executive Branch has sometimes claimed that President Wilson
unilaterally terminated a treaty with Belgium in 1920, but this is incorrect. Pursuant to Congress’s
directive in the Seaman’s Act, see supra note 93 and accompanying text, Wilson had given notice
to Belgium in 1916 that the United States was terminating certain provisions in a treaty
concerning the Congo. See Letter from Robert Lansing, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Baron Beyens,
Belg. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Nov. 11, 1916), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 34, 34–35 (1925) (notifying the Government of Belgium that
pursuant to an Act of Congress, the United States government was terminating certain portions of
a previously-agreed-upon treaty). Belgium responded by saying that it preferred simply to
terminate the entire treaty, and it asked the United States to formally acknowledge this
denunciation. Letter from Baron Beyens, Belg. Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Robert Lansing,
U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 31, 1916), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra, at 35, 36. Eventually, in 1920, the United States “acknowledge[d]”
Belgium’s notice of termination. Letter from Norman H. Davis, U.S. Undersecretary of State, to
Brand Whitlock, U.S. Ambassador to Belg. (Nov. 19, 1920), in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1920, at 207, 207–09 (1935). Noting that the treaty
did not contain any clause specifying the amount of notice required for withdrawal, the United
States said that it would assume that the Belgian government wished the treaty to have terminated
one year from the time of its notice of termination, since that was a customary period of notice.
Id. at 209. The treaty was therefore terminated by Belgium, not the United States, and the U.S.
action that prompted Belgium to terminate the treaty was directed by Congress.
184. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 4591 (1927) (presenting a letter from an unknown source in
Mexico explaining the theft of American property by a newly radical Mexican government).
185. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Withdrawal of United States from International
Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (July 5,
1933), reprinted in DEP’T OF STATE, PRESS RELEASES, JULY 1–DECEMBER 30, 1933 18, 18; see
also 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1933, at 783–86
(1950) (collecting telegram exchanges between U.S. officials that document the considerations
surrounding the decision to withdraw from the convention).
186. See 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1933, at 552–
69 (1949) (collecting telegram exchanges between U.S. officials that document the Insull affair).
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treaty was subsequently negotiated, however, Roosevelt withdrew the
notice.187
In 1936, the Executive Branch withdrew the United States from a
commercial treaty with Italy.188
The State Department wrote a
memorandum advising President Roosevelt that this unilateral action was
constitutional.189 While acknowledging that “[t]he question as to the
authority of the Executive to terminate treaties independently of the
Congress or of the Senate is in a somewhat confused state,” the
memorandum maintained that “[n]o settled rule or procedure has been
followed.”190 It also noted that there was a potential conflict between the
treaty with Italy and a 1934 trade statute and that, if the treaty were not
terminated, the President could “be placed in the position of having to
choose between the execution of the act and observance of the treaty.”191
The memorandum observed that this situation was “closely analogous” to
the termination of provisions in the Swiss treaty in 1899, and it said that the
1899 “precedent” was confirmed by the U.S. withdrawal from the import–
export treaty in 1933.192
B.

Establishing a Pattern

Because many of the early-twentieth-century presidential terminations
were based on potential conflicts with statutes, these actions would not
necessarily have been understood as fully unilateral in nature. By the late
1930s, however, the Executive Branch was increasingly asserting a purely
unilateral authority. In 1939, the Roosevelt Administration announced that
the United States was terminating a commercial treaty with Japan, after
resolutions had been introduced in both houses of Congress supporting
withdrawal.193 In connection with this decision, the State Department
argued that the President had unilateral termination authority, this time
relying on the “general spirit” of the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in
187. See ADLER, supra note 75, at 184–85.
188. See 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1936, at 356–
59 (1954) (collecting exchanges between U.S. officials that document this withdrawal).
189. Memorandum from R. Walton Moore, Acting U.S. Sec’y of State, to President Roosevelt
5 (Nov. 9, 1936) (on file with author).
190. Id. at 2–3.
191. Id. at 3–4.
192. Id. at 4–5. The State Department Legal Adviser had prepared a memorandum earlier that
year on abrogation of treaties. That memorandum contends that, regardless of whether the
President has a general power to terminate treaties unilaterally, it seems “that little doubt could
arise when, as in the case of the Seaman’s Act, he is called upon to terminate provisions of treaties
inconsistent with an Act of Congress and when failure to do so would place this Government in
the position of failing to observe its treaty obligations.” HACKWORTH, supra note 75, at 327–28
(citing the Legal Adviser’s memorandum).
193. H.R. Res. 264, 76th Cong. (1939); S. Res. 166, 76th Cong. (1939); Letter from Cordell
Hull, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Horinouchi (July 26, 1939), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1939, at 558, 558–59 (1955).
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,194 which had referred to the
“delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations.”195 The State
Department reasoned that “the power to denounce a treaty inheres in the
President of the United States in his capacity as Chief Executive of a
sovereign state,” and it further contended that the President had “full control
over the foreign relations of the nation, except as specifically limited by the
Constitution.”196
The 1930s also saw a political transformation in the United States,
with Roosevelt having landslide victories in the presidential elections of
1932 and 1936 and the Democrats coming to dominate both houses of
Congress.197 In addition, the national security environment was changing
significantly in this period, with increasing aggression by Adolf Hitler in
Germany, the invasion of China by Japan, and eventually the start of World
War II. This environment was conducive to broader claims of executive
authority. A year after Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Belmont,198 in which it held that a sole executive agreement
entered into by President Roosevelt as part of his recognition of the Soviet
Union preempted state law.199 Shortly thereafter, the Court began giving
absolute deference to Executive Branch determinations relating to foreign
sovereign immunity.200
National security soon became directly relevant to the issue of treaty
termination and suspension. In 1939, for example, President Roosevelt
suspended the London Naval Treaty (which limited naval armaments)
because of the changed circumstances created by the war in Europe.201 Two
194. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
195. Id. at 320. The Court in Curtiss-Wright, in an opinion authored by Justice Sutherland,
upheld a delegation of authority from Congress to the President to criminalize arms sales to
countries involved in a conflict in Latin America. Id. at 329–33.
196. HACKWORTH, supra note 75, at 331–32 (excerpting from a State Department
memorandum).
197. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 286, 311 (1998).
198. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
199. Id. at 327. The opinion in Belmont, like the opinion in Curtiss-Wright, was authored by
Justice Sutherland. Id. at 325; supra note 195.
200. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1945) (deferring to the State
Department in deciding foreign-government immunity); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
586–87 (1943) (holding that a ship owned by Peru, seized in the course of private litigation,
should be released because the State Department declared Peru immune from suit); Compania
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (deferring to the
Executive Branch in determining whether foreign governments are immune from suit); see also
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 110–26 (Mariner Books 2004) (1973)
(describing Roosevelt’s increasingly aggressive approach to the exercise of foreign-affairs
authority); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (referring to “the triumph of executive discretion in the
constitutional regime of foreign relations between 1933 and the close of the Second World War”).
201. See Armament Reduction, 1 DEP’T ST. BULL. 354, 354 (1939).
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years later, he suspended, for the duration of the war, the International Load
Lines Convention (which regulated ocean shipping) after his Attorney
General, Francis Biddle, advised him that “[t]he convention may be
declared inoperative or suspended by the President.”202 Biddle also noted,
however, that, since “[i]t is not proposed that the United States denounce
the convention under [the unilateral withdrawal clause in the treaty], nor
that it be otherwise abrogated. . . . [A]ction by the Senate or by the
Congress is not required.”203 The opinion thus seemed to suggest that a full
termination of a treaty, as opposed to a suspension, would require
legislative action. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt Administration terminated
another treaty unilaterally in 1944—a protocol relating to a Latin American
trademark treaty—citing the treaty’s general ineffectiveness.204
The 1950s saw several additional unilateral presidential terminations,
usually in low-profile situations that did not generate much attention, such
as the Truman Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from a
whaling convention205 and the Eisenhower Administration’s termination of
both a Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for the Classification of
Merchandise and a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with
El Salvador.206 Although not solely a U.S. termination, the Eisenhower
Administration also entered into a sole executive agreement in 1958 with
Morocco to end a treaty relating to the management of a lighthouse in that
country.207
A 1958 memorandum from the State Department’s Deputy Assistant
Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, William Whittington, noted that, although
“matters of policy or special circumstances may make it appear to be
advisable or necessary to obtain the concurrence or support of the Congress
or the Senate,” in practice treaties have been terminated in a variety of
ways, including through unilateral presidential action.208 The memorandum
also asserted that, at least for a self-executing treaty containing a unilateral
withdrawal clause, “it is now generally considered that . . . it is proper for
the Executive acting alone to take the action necessary to terminate or
denounce the treaty.”209 Attached to the memorandum were appendices

202. Int’l Load Line Convention, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 123 (1941).
203. Id.
204. Treaty Information, 11 DEP’T ST. BULL. 442, 442 (1944).
205. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 83
(1979) [hereinafter Treaty Termination Hearings].
206. See Treaty Information, 32 DEP’T ST. BULL. 906, 906 (1955) (noting the withdrawal
from the nomenclature convention); Treaty Information, 38 DEP’T ST. BULL. 238, 238 (1958)
(noting the termination of the treaty with El Salvador).
207. Cape Spartel Light: Transfer of Management to Morocco; Termination of Convention of
May 31, 1865, Mar. 31, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 527, 532.
208. See Whittington Memorandum, supra note 25, at 5–6.
209. Id. at 5.
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listing the various treaty terminations in U.S. history and how they were
carried out.210
The practice of unilateral terminations continued during the 1960s. In
1962, the Kennedy Administration terminated a commercial treaty with
Cuba as part of the United States’ embargo policy following the Cuban
revolution.211 In 1965, the Johnson Administration gave notice that the
United States was withdrawing from the Warsaw Convention that governs
liability for international air carriers,212 but retracted the withdrawal shortly
before the notice period expired.213
There were still occasions in this period, however, in which the United
States terminated treaties pursuant to congressional directive. In 1951, for
example, President Truman terminated commercial treaties with the Soviet
Union and various Eastern European countries pursuant to a directive in the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.214
In 1976, the Ford
Administration withdrew the United States from several treaties relating to
fishing pursuant to a directive in the 1976 Fishery Conservation and
Management Act.215
C.

Termination of the Taiwan Treaty

During the 1970s, the United States began to pursue closer relations
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As one of the conditions to a
normalization of relations between the two countries, the PRC insisted that
the United States terminate its 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
Anticipating a change in Executive Branch policy concerning Taiwan,
210. Id. at 7.
211. See Convention for Commercial Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, Dec. 11, 1902, 33 Stat.
2136 (establishing good commercial relations between the United States and Cuba); Proclamation
No. 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962), reprinted in 76
Stat. 1446 (1962) (terminating commercial relations with Cuba).
212. See Treaty Information, 53 DEP’T ST. BULL. 923, 924 (1965) (relating the United States’
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention and its attempt to negotiate revised terms).
213. See Press Release, Dep’t of State, United States Government Action Concerning the
Warsaw Convention (May 5, 1966), reprinted in The Warsaw Convention—Recent Developments
and the Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 243, 245–46 (1966)
(discussing the United States’ notification of termination and its subsequent withdrawal of that
notice). For commentary suggesting that the proposed unilateral withdrawal would have been
unconstitutional, see John H. Riggs, Jr., Termination of Treaties by the Executive Without
Congressional Approval: The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 526, 527–28
(1966), and Comment, Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the
Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580, 581–82 (1967).
214. See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, 65 Stat. 72 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012)) (giving the President authority to take action in order to bring trade
agreements “into conformity” with the Act); Proclamation No. 2949, 3 C.F.R. § 134 (1949–1953),
reprinted in 65 Stat. c44 (1951).
215. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 202(b),
90 Stat. 331, 340–41 (giving the Executive Branch power to renegotiate international fishing
treaties).
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Congress in 1978 enacted (and the President signed) the International
Security Assistance Act, which, among other things, expressed “the sense
of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the
Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy changes
affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty [with
Taiwan] of 1954.”216 In December 1978, President Carter announced that
the United States would recognize the PRC as the sole government of China
and would terminate the Taiwan treaty pursuant to the unilateral withdrawal
clause in the treaty (which required one year’s notice).217
In a memorandum advising the President that he had the constitutional
authority to terminate the treaty, the State Department Legal Adviser relied
heavily on historical practice.218 The memorandum cited twelve instances
in which presidents had purportedly terminated treaties unilaterally, and it
included an extensive appendix entitled “History of Treaty Terminations by
the United States.”219 The memorandum concluded that “[w]hile treaty
termination may be and sometimes has been undertaken by the President
following Congressional or Senate action, such action is not legally
necessary.”220
Carter’s action prompted substantial debate in the Senate. Several
resolutions were introduced in early January 1979, including a resolution
sponsored by Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., that provided that it was “the sense of
the Senate that approval of the U.S. Senate is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation.”221
The Foreign Relations Committee held three days of hearings on this

216. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26(b), 92 Stat. 730,
746; see also Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1978: Statement on Signing
S. 3075 into Law (Sept. 26, 1978), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JIMMY CARTER, 1978, at 1636, 1636 (1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS OF JIMMY
CARTER].
217. See President Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation: Diplomatic Relations Between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 15, 1978), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF JIMMY
CARTER, supra note 216, at 2264, 2264–65 (recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China
and announcing his intention to maintain relations with Taiwan “through nongovernmental
means”).
218. See Hansell Memorandum, supra note 121, at 397–99 (listing past presidential treaty
terminations). For criticism of the State Department’s description of the historical practice, see,
for example, J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46, 77–78
(1978); David J. Scheffer, Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United
States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 931, 979 (1978); and
Jonathan York Thomas, Article, The Abuse of History: A Refutation of the State Department
Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination, 6 YALE STUD.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 27, 30 (1979).
219. Hansell Memorandum, supra note 121, at 397–98, 400.
220. Id. at 395.
221. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 475 (1979).
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resolution.222 The hearings included testimony and prepared statements
from a variety of witnesses, including a number of scholars. Scholars such
as Arthur Bestor, Thomas Franck, and Michael Reisman testified or
submitted statements in favor of senatorial or congressional participation in
treaty termination.223 Other scholars, such as Abram Chayes, Andreas
Lowenfeld, and John Norton Moore, testified in favor of a unilateral
presidential power of termination.224
The Foreign Relations Committee rejected the approach of the Byrd
Resolution and reported out instead a resolution that would have recognized
fourteen grounds for justifying unilateral presidential action to terminate
treaty obligations, including the existence of a termination clause.225 After
it reached the Senate floor, however, the Senate (on a vote of 59–35)
substituted for its consideration the original Byrd Resolution, after Byrd’s
motion for substitution was supported by a number of Senators who
expressed the view that the President should not have unilateral power over
treaty termination.226 But the Senate never actually voted on this
resolution.227
In the meantime, former Senator Barry Goldwater, along with a group
of eight current senators and sixteen current members of the House of
Representatives, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court in D.C. seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the termination of the Taiwan
treaty.228 The district court initially dismissed the suit without prejudice,
reasoning that the legislators would not have standing until there was action
taken on the resolutions pending in the Senate.229 After the substitution of
the Byrd Resolution in the Senate, the plaintiffs argued that they now had
standing, and the court agreed, noting that the action on the Resolution was
“evidence [of] at least some congressional determination to participate in
the process whereby a mutual defense treaty is terminated, and clearly falls
short of approving the President’s termination effort.”230 The court
proceeded to reach the merits and concluded that “the President’s notice of
termination must receive the approval of two-thirds of the United States
Senate or a majority of both houses of Congress for it to be effective under

222. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at iii (indicating that the hearings were
held from April 9 to 11, 1979).
223. Id. at 25–32, 223–74, 387–96.
224. Id. at 306–12, 396–425, 426–43.
225. 125 CONG. REC. 13,685 (1979). For the discussion in the Senate of this issue, see id. at
13,672–710.
226. Id. at 13,695–96.
227. Id. at 13,710.
228. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11893, at *1 (D.D.C. June 6,
1979).
229. Id. at *16–17.
230. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.D.C. 1979).
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our Constitution to terminate the [Taiwan treaty].”231 In addition to textual
and structural considerations, the court relied on historical practice,
reasoning that “[t]he predominate United States’ practice in terminating
treaties, including those containing notice provisions, has involved mutual
action by the executive and legislative branches.”232
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that President Carter’s termination
of the treaty was constitutional.233 In addition to emphasizing the
President’s role as “sole organ” in foreign relations, the court noted that the
historical practice was varied and that there was no past instance in which
“a treaty [has] been continued in force over the opposition of the
President.”234 The court also emphasized that Carter had acted pursuant to a
unilateral withdrawal clause in the treaty and reasoned that “the President’s
authority . . . is at its zenith when the Senate has consented to a treaty that
expressly provides for termination on one year’s notice, and the President’s
action is the giving of notice of termination.”235 In other words, the court
was claiming that Carter was acting within the highest category of
presidential authority laid out by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in
Youngstown.236
Judge MacKinnon issued a lengthy dissent, focused especially on the
history of treaty terminations.
He contended that “[c]ongressional
participation in termination has been the overwhelming historical
practice.”237 As for the instances of unilateral presidential termination,
MacKinnon reasoned:
It is almost farcical for appellant to contend that the President, acting
alone, has absolute power to terminate a major United States defense
treaty, and by the same token hereafter any defense treaty, because a
few earlier Presidents withdrew financial support of a treaty bureau
because of non-filing of trademarks by El Salvador, Honduras,
Paraguay, et al., and terminated several violated treaties, or
terminated treaties relating to a light house museum in Morocco,
nomenclature in economic reports, smuggling with a country with

231. Id. at 965.
232. Id. at 960–64.
233. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
234. Id. at 706–07.
235. Id. at 708.
236. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate.”).
237. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 723 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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whom we had no commercial treaty, or with respect to which notices
of termination had been given and then withdrawn.238
MacKinnon also argued that the majority’s suggestion that the treaty itself
authorized Carter to engage in unilateral termination was a “deceptive
misstatement” since “the President is not named in the Treaty to give notice
of termination” and “[t]he sole issue in this case is who can act for the
United States; that issue is not determined by the Treaty but by the
Constitution of the United States.”239
Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C.
Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.240
Four Justices reasoned that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question.241 Providing a fifth vote for nonjusticiability, Justice Powell
reasoned that the case was not politically ripe, given that the Senate had
never voted on a resolution to disapprove the termination. “If the Congress
chooses not to confront the President,” said Powell, “it is not our task to do
so.”242 The controversy effectively ended with this dismissal.243

D.

Subsequent Treaty Terminations

In the years since the controversy over the termination of the Taiwan
treaty, the United States has terminated dozens of treaties, and almost all of
these terminations have been accomplished by unilateral presidential action.
To take one example, the Reagan Administration gave notice in 1985 of its
termination of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with
Nicaragua, and the treaty terminated the following year.244 In 2002, the
238. Id. at 733–34 (emphasis omitted). For additional criticism of the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning, see generally Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan
Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980).
239. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 737 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
240. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979).
241. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J, concurring) (opinion joined by Justices Stewart and Stevens
and Chief Justice Burger).
242. Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan reasoned that the termination was
lawful because it was “a necessary incident” to President Carter’s recognition of mainland China,
which fell within his constitutional authority. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices
Blackmun and White wanted to hold oral argument before making a decision. Id. at 1006
(Blackmun & White, JJ., dissenting in part).
243. For additional discussion of the termination controversy, see generally VICTORIA MARIE
KRAFT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY: TERMINATING THE TAIWAN TREATY
(1991). In the mid-1980s, Goldwater introduced a resolution that would have provided that it was
the sense of the Senate that, unless otherwise provided in a treaty, termination required either the
advice and consent of the Senate or congressional approval. S. Res. 40, 99th Cong., 131 CONG.
REC. 678 (1985). But the Senate never voted on the resolution. See id. at 679–80.
244. Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua, 85 DEP’T ST. BULL. 74, 74–75 (1985). A
federal district court subsequently applied the political question doctrine to dismiss a challenge to
this termination. See Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1198–99 (D. Mass.
1986) (“[A] challenge to the President’s power vis-a-vis treaty termination raise[s] a
nonjusticiable political question.”). Not all the terminations were unilateral. In 1986, Congress
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State Department Legal Adviser’s Office listed twenty-three bilateral
treaties and seven multilateral treaties that had been terminated by
presidential action since termination of the Taiwan treaty.245 Since then, the
Bush Administration terminated two treaties: a protocol to a consular
convention in 2005246 and a tax treaty with Sweden in 2007.247
Most of these terminations do not appear to have generated
controversy. An exception is President George W. Bush’s announcement in
2002 that he was withdrawing the United States from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia. In an Op-Ed article, the prominent
constitutional law scholar Bruce Ackerman contended that Bush was acting
unconstitutionally and asked rhetorically, “If President Bush is allowed to
terminate the ABM treaty, what is to stop future presidents from
unilaterally taking America out of NATO or the United Nations?”248 As
noted earlier, thirty-two members of Congress brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of the termination of the ABM Treaty, but the suit was
dismissed for lack of standing and under the political question doctrine.249
The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a
memorandum concluding that the President had the authority to suspend or
terminate the treaty.250 The memorandum relies on textual and structural
directed President Reagan to terminate a tax treaty and an air services treaty with South Africa as
part of the Anti-Apartheid Act (which was enacted over Reagan’s veto), and he did so. See
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, 1104
(directing the President to terminate the treaties); Current Actions, 86 DEP’T ST. BULL. 84, 87
(1986) (indicating that the treaties had been terminated).
245. OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2002, at 202–06 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds.,
2002).
246. Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and
Consular Convention Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS add. (Mar. 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/
20120716203621/http://www.asil.org/insights050309a.cfm.
247. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Estate and Gift Tax
Treaty with Sweden (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/hp463.aspx.
248. Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Treaties Don’t Belong to Presidents Alone, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/29/opinion/treaties-don-t-belong-to-presidentsalone.html. In a very partial description of the historical practice, Ackerman mentioned
Congress’s 1798 termination of the French treaties and President Polk’s solicitation of
congressional authorization to terminate the Oregon Territory Treaty in 1846, and then asserted
that “[t]he big change occurred in 1978, when Jimmy Carter unilaterally terminated our mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan.” Id.
249. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002). Some members of the House of
Representatives proposed a resolution that would have opposed termination of the ABM Treaty on
policy grounds, but it did not take a position on the constitutionality of the termination, and the
House never voted on it. See H.R. Res. 313, 107th Cong. (2001) (asserting that termination of the
ABM Treaty could, among other things, “be perceived by other nations as a threat” and “weaken
ties with traditional allies”); see also 147 CONG. REC. 25,917 (2001) (introducing H.R. Res. 313
but not voting on it).
250. Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 52, at 9. OLC later disavowed this and
another opinion relating to the suspension of treaty obligations, in part because it found
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arguments such as the Vesting Clause Thesis and the President’s role as the
“sole organ” in foreign relations, as well as on historical practice.251
Invoking the historical gloss concept, the memorandum reasons that “[t]he
executive branch has long held the view that the President has the
constitutional authority to terminate treaties unilaterally, and the legislative
branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in it.”252 While
acknowledging that Congress and the Senate have sometimes been involved
in treaty terminations, the memorandum contends that “[t]hese examples
represent the workings of practical politics, rather than acquiescence in a
constitutional régime.”253 Despite complaints by select members of
Congress, there was no formal effort by Congress as a body to oppose the
termination of the ABM Treaty,254 and Congress ultimately approved
funding for Bush’s missile defense plan.255
E.

Shift in Scholarly Commentary

As late as the early twentieth century, most commentators took the
position that the President needed either senatorial or congressional
approval to terminate a treaty. Charles Butler’s highly regarded treatise on
the U.S. treaty-making power, published in 1902, noted that treaties could
be abrogated “by Congressional action in several different methods” and
did not seem to contemplate termination by unilateral presidential action.256
Similarly, the prominent constitutional law scholar Edward Corwin, in his
1917 book, The President’s Control of Foreign Relations, stated: “All in
unconvincing the reasoning in the opinions suggesting that the President could suspend a treaty
even when such suspension was not permissible under international law. See Memorandum of
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., for the Files, Status of Certain OLC
Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 8–9 (Jan. 15,
2009), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20090115.pdf
(indicating that the two opinions should not be relied upon “to the extent they suggest[] that the
President has unlimited authority to suspend a treaty beyond the circumstances traditionally
recognized”). OLC noted, however, that a 2007 opinion, which it was not disavowing, had
observed that presidents have traditionally exercised the power to suspend treaties unilaterally
“where suspension was authorized by the terms of the treaty or under recognized principles of
international law.” Id. at 9.
251. Yoo & Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 52, at 3–5, 13.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 14.
254. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21088, WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE ABM TREATY: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (2002) (noting that “the ABM Treaty has been
terminated by President Bush in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and neither Congress nor
the courts have acted to forestall or overturn that action”). Senator Kyl spoke on the floor of the
Senate in favor of President Bush’s authority to terminate the ABM Treaty. See 148 CONG. REC.
4536 (2002) (Sen. Kyl) (arguing that the text and structure of the Constitution, the intent of the
Framers, and Supreme Court precedent all established executive authority to terminate treaties).
255. See Paul Richter, Senate GOP Wins Funding Battle for Missile Defense, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jun/27/nation/na-missile27.
256. 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 384, at 129 (1902).
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all, it appears that legislative precedent, which moreover is generally
supported by the attitude of the Executive, sanctions the proposition that the
power of terminating the international compacts to which the United States
is party belongs, as a prerogative of sovereignty, to Congress alone.”257
Quincy Wright similarly supported legislative involvement in treaty
termination in his important 1922 treatise on foreign relations law, although
his discussion is somewhat more equivocal than Corwin’s, stating that the
President “ought not to [terminate] without consent either of Congress or of
the Senate, except in extraordinary circumstances.”258 Also writing in 1922
(shortly before becoming Solicitor of the State Department), Charles
Cheney Hyde noted in his treatise on international law that “[i]n behalf of
the United States, notice of termination is given by the President,
commonly in pursuance of a joint resolution of the Congress; and it has
followed the unanimous resolution of the Senate.”259
As noted earlier, an important exception to this early-twentieth-century
consensus was the view of the constitutional law scholar Westel
Willoughby, who stated without discussion in his 1910 constitutional law
treatise that “[t]hough the Senate participates in the ratification of treaties,
the President has the authority, without asking for senatorial advice and
consent, to denounce an existing treaty and to declare it no longer binding
upon the United States.”260 The second edition of Willoughby’s treatise,
published in 1929, contains a much more extensive discussion of the issue
of treaty termination, but it argues only that the President is not obligated to
submit his treaty terminations to the full Congress and does not specifically
address whether he must obtain the consent of the Senate.261
In any event, by the 1920s there were additional commentators who
defended a unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties. For
example, John Mabry Mathews, in his 1922 treatise on foreign relations
law, argued that

257. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 115 (1917).
258. QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 260 (1922). The
year before, however, Wright had stated that “[p]ractice seems to sanction independent initial
negotiation and denunciation of treaties by the President.” Quincy Wright, The Control of
Foreign Relations, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 11 (1921) (emphasis added).
259. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 539, at 80 (1922).
260. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 223 (1910).
261. See 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 324, at 585 (2d ed. 1929) (“[T]here is no constitutional obligation upon the part of the
Executive to submit his treaty denunciations to the Congress for its approval . . . .”). On the issue
of whether the President needed congressional approval, Willoughby expressly disagreed with
Corwin. See id. at 585 n.59 (stating that “[t]he author cannot, therefore, accept the conclusion of
Corwin” that the power of treaty termination rests with Congress).
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since the Senate has already, in its treaty-making capacity, acted
upon a treaty providing for its termination upon notice, no further
Senatorial action is necessary in effecting such termination, and that
the President alone, as the mouthpiece of the nation in its
international relations, may denounce the treaty by giving notice of
its termination.262
Similarly, Jesse Reeves (a political science professor at the University of
Michigan) expressed the view in 1921 that “[i]t seems to be within the
power of the President to terminate treaties by giving notice on his own
motion without previous Congressional or Senatorial action.”263
Nevertheless, scholarly views continued to be mixed, and there did not
appear to be any settled understanding that the President possessed a
unilateral power of termination. Berkeley law professor Stefan Riesenfeld,
writing in 1937, argued that
[t]he most logical view is that the power to denounce a treaty is
vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, so that the department of the government which makes the
treaty can terminate it, regardless of whether the termination is by
unilateral, but lawful, denunciation or by a new treaty.264
In his history of the Senate, published in 1938, George Haynes observed
that there was uncertainty about whether the President could unilaterally
terminate a treaty and that “[d]enunciation of treaties has usually been by
joint resolution, originating sometimes in the House, sometimes in the
Senate.”265
By the 1940s, however, scholarly commentary was increasingly
supportive of unilateral presidential authority. For example, the second
edition of Hyde’s treatise on international law (published in 1945 after
Hyde had served as Solicitor for the State Department) added to what it had
stated in 1922 as follows:
The President is not believed, however, to lack authority to
denounce, in pursuance of its terms, a treaty to which the United
States is a party, without legislative approval. In taking such action,
he is merely exercising in behalf of the nation a privilege already
conferred upon it by the agreement, and which involves no necessary
modification thereof. Denunciation in such case may be regarded as

262. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 252
(1922).
263. Reeves, supra note 101, at 38.
264. Riesenfeld, supra note 135, at 660.
265. 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND
PRACTICE 670 (1938).
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a mere normal incident in the conduct of foreign relations as they are
confided to the Executive.266
This was also a time of significant discussion of the President’s power to
conclude executive agreements, and commentators who favored broad
presidential authority to conclude such agreements also tended to favor
unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties.267
There were additional scholarly endorsements of unilateral presidential
termination authority in the 1950s and 1960s.268 The American Law
Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, published in 1965, continued this trend. It contended that the
President had the authority to terminate a treaty pursuant to the terms of the
treaty or based on the grounds for termination allowed under international
law.269 The Restatement explained that this power stemmed from “the
authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States as part of the executive power vested in him by Article II, Section 1
of the Constitution.”270
266. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 539, at 1519–20 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (footnote omitted).
267. See, e.g., WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 306 (1941)
(claiming that “[i]n treaty making[,] . . . negative action, not being feared by the constitution
makers, was left to the repository of general executive power”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 336–37 (1945) (asserting that termination of
both executive agreements and treaties can be “effected by executive denunciation, with or
without prior Congressional authorization”). Many years later, in the context of President Carter’s
termination of the Taiwan Treaty, McDougal appeared to have changed his mind. See Treaty
Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at 387, 391 (statement of Michael Reisman) (averring on
behalf of himself and McDougal that “the constitutional system, if we are going back to this
fundamental dynamic, seems to be based on a notion of sharing of power, rather than shifting it all
to one branch”). McDougal also joined an amicus brief in the Taiwan case on behalf of the
plaintiffs, Brief of Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for Certiorari, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (No. 79-856), and co-authored an
article in the National Law Journal arguing against a unilateral presidential power of termination.
See Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?,
NAT’L L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19, 19 (“[I]n the absence of material breach or rebus sic stantibus
and, arguably, in the absence of an overwhelming external crisis to the body politic, the
presumption must be that the president requires congressional authorization to terminate any
agreement, other than a presidential agreement.”).
268. See, e.g., 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT § 215, at 132 (1963) (noting that the unilateral
termination of a treaty by the President “appears justified by the constitutional position of the
President as the nation’s sole organ of foreign intercourse”); Randall H. Nelson, The Termination
of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 879, 887 (1958) (expounding that, because the “conduct of foreign relations” is a “plenary
executive power” and no limitation is placed on treaty termination under the Constitution, the
President has the power to unilaterally terminate treaties).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 163 (1965).
270. Id. § 163 cmt. a.
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In his influential foreign relations law treatise, published in 1972,
Louis Henkin suggested that the answer to the constitutional question was
unclear but that “since the President acts for the United States
internationally he can effectively terminate or violate treaties, and the
Senate has not established its authority to join or veto him.”271 He also
noted that “[i]f issues as to who has power to terminate treaties arise
again, . . . it seems unlikely that Congress will successfully assert the
power.”272 Here, Henkin appears to have been making a political science
observation as much as a legal observation: whatever one may think about
the correct distribution of constitutional authority on this issue, Henkin was
suggesting that the President’s assertion of unilateral authority was likely to
prevail as a practical matter in congressional–executive relations.273
Historical practice since 1972 tends to support this assessment.
The controversy over President Carter’s termination of the Taiwan
treaty revealed that the issue was still not settled, and, as noted, a number of
scholars at that time took the position that congressional or senatorial
approval was required for treaty termination.274 Since that termination,
however, the controversy seems to have receded. Like the earlier
Restatement (Second), the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, published in 1987, contends that the President has
the authority to terminate a treaty as long as the treaty allows for unilateral
withdrawal or there is an international-law ground for termination.275 A
number of scholars, including some who do not always favor expansive
readings of presidential authority, have agreed with this proposition.276 As
a result, it is probably fair to describe this as the prevailing, although
certainly not unanimous, view.277
271. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 169 (1972).
272. Id. at 170.
273. See also FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 194 (2d ed. 1989) (“[T]he President has
demonstrated an effective power to terminate treaties, and the Senate has not successfully
challenged that right to do so.”).
274. See supra text accompanying note 223.
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 339 (1987).
276. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 153–55 (1990)
(pronouncing the Restatement’s position “sound”); Jinks & Sloss, supra note 38, at 156 (agreeing
with the functionalist rationale of presidential power to terminate treaties).
277. In its comprehensive 2001 study on treaties, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the Congressional Research Service noted that “[t]he constitutional requirements that
attend the termination of treaties remain a matter of some controversy,” and it described the issue
of whether the President has a unilateral termination power to be “a live issue.” CRS STUDY,
supra note 42, at 198–99. Nevertheless, it also noted that, “[a]s a practical matter . . . the
President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by
an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect.” Id. at 201; cf.
H. Jefferson Powell, Essay, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch
Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 562 (1999) (“Despite its obvious importance and the
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IV. Implications for Law, Theory, and Politics
This Part considers the implications of the historical practice of U.S.
treaty terminations, both for the specific issue of whether the President has
a unilateral termination authority and for the more general historical gloss
method of constitutional interpretation. It also reflects on the extent to
which a practice-based account of institutional authority, such as the
account given here, constitutes a description of constitutional law as
opposed to a description of mere politics.
A.

Current Law of Treaty Termination

As we have seen, as a matter of practice, presidents today exercise a
unilateral power of treaty termination. The precedent for this practice can
be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century, and the practice has
been especially robust since the 1930s.278 Moreover, with the important
exception of the debate over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, Congress
has not seriously opposed exercises of this presidential authority.279 Even
during the Taiwan Treaty debate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
took the position that the President had the authority to terminate a treaty
when, as was true there, termination was permissible under international
law. To be sure, a majority of the Senate appeared to disagree with the
Committee, but it is also the case that the full Senate never voted on any
resolution to contest the President’s authority.
As discussed in Part I, most accounts of how historical practice can
inform the separation of powers would require “acquiescence” by the
affected branch of government. There are a number of conceptual
difficulties with this concept, however, especially as applied to Congress,
and these difficulties argue for caution before treating mere inaction by
Congress as acquiescence.280 Nevertheless, the congressional inaction
surrounding the issue of treaty termination is noteworthy. First, it has been
longstanding, involving numerous congresses and presidential
administrations, during times of both unified and divided government.
With the exception of the debate over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty,
there has been a century of congressional passivity in the face of
presidential treaty terminations. Second, Congress has failed to protest
presidential terminations even with “soft law” measures such as one-house
resolutions or statements by congressional leadership, even when
presidential treaty terminations have received significant public attention
(as they did, for example, in both the Taiwan termination debate and the
substantial history surrounding the issue, the question of which political branch has the power to
withdraw from or terminate treaties remains unsettled.”).
278. See supra subpart III(B).
279. See supra subpart III(C).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71.
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debate over the termination of the ABM Treaty). Third, even though it has
approved numerous treaties containing withdrawal clauses, the Senate has
failed to address the question of which U.S. actor can invoke these clauses,
even though it could easily do so in its resolutions of advice and consent.281
There are, in any event, reasons for crediting historical practice in the
separation of powers area that do not turn on institutional acquiescence.282
One such reason is the general desirability, for legitimacy and other
reasons, of having an account of constitutional law that bears a reasonable
resemblance to actual constitutional practice, both now and in the
foreseeable future.283 In addition, if in fact government actors look to past
practice to inform their own understanding of—and to shape their claims
about—the law, legal philosophers working in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart
would treat that second-order practice as itself a fundamental feature of the
legal order.284 These considerations have particular salience for the issue of
treaty termination. Unilateral presidential termination of treaties is an
established and longstanding practice, and it seems unlikely that Congress
will do anything in the coming years to destabilize that practice. Moreover,
the courts have shown little inclination to resolve the issue, and the longer
they wait the more entrenched the practice becomes. As a result, an
account of modern U.S. constitutional law that denied a presidential
authority to terminate treaties (at least as a general matter) would face
serious descriptive limitations.285

281. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 399–405 (2000) (discussing conditions imposed by the Senate
in connection with its ratification of human rights treaties).
282. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 456–60 (describing reasons for crediting
historical practice concerning separation of powers).
283. See id. at 456 (arguing that the legitimacy of a law is partially tied to actual behavior and
practice related to it); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 66 (1986) (“The justification need
not fit every aspect or feature of the practice, but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to
see himself as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”); LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 81 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing the importance of “congruence between official
action and the law”).
284. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–99 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing secondary
“rules of recognition”); Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
145, 150 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (“The ultimate rule of recognition is a matter of social fact,
and so determining it is for empirical investigation rather than legal analysis.”); see also
Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma, Introduction to THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION xiii, xv (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (“[T]he
U.S. rule of recognition may be substantially longer and more complicated than a simple reference
to the 1787 Constitution (or the Amendment Clause thereof), in part because it may give
independent effect to extraconstitutional sources of law, such as judicial precedent or official
custom.”).
285. Because the precise contours of constitutional custom are contestable, it is still possible
to argue as a descriptive matter that certain types of treaties are not subject to unilateral
presidential termination. It might be argued, for example, that in light of Congress’s power to
declare war, a president may not unilaterally terminate a peace treaty.

BRADLEY.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss

3/24/2014 12:07 PM

823

The absence of judicial review may itself be related to the
longstanding nature of the practice. In abstaining on this issue, courts may
reasonably perceive that the durability of a practice over numerous
presidential administrations is evidence that the practice is functionally
desirable, or at least not too functionally problematic.286 It is easy to
imagine that there are advantages to the United States of being able to make
credible threats of exit from treaty regimes as part of negotiations to reform
international institutions or induce better compliance by its treaty
partners—advantages that could be facilitated by allowing for unilateral
presidential action.287 Moreover, it is possible that ease of exit as a matter
of U.S. constitutional procedure makes it easier to persuade the Senate to
agree to such treaties in the first place.288 While such ease of exit could also
in theory be destabilizing to foreign relations, it is not obvious from the
historical record that there is any presidential tendency to devalue
international commitments more than Congress.
For all these reasons, the best description of the current U.S.
constitutional law governing treaty termination is probably as described by
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law: the President has the
unilateral authority to terminate treaties when such termination is permitted
under international law and is not disallowed either by the Senate in its
advice and consent to the treaty or by Congress in a statute.289 Unlike the
Restatement (Third), however, which chiefly relies on a purported
implication of the President’s role as the “sole organ” in foreign affairs,290
the account presented here is grounded chiefly in the longstanding accretion
of Executive Branch practice and claims in the face of congressional
inaction and judicial abstention.
Some scholars (and, for a time, the Executive Branch during the Bush
Administration) have gone even further, suggesting that the President can

286. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (explaining, in
declining to invalidate a congressional delegation of foreign-affairs authority to the President, that
“[t]he uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice” of making broad delegations
to the President in foreign affairs “rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even
if the practice found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at
liberty at this late day to disturb”).
287. Cf. Matthew C. Waxman, The Constitutional Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that, in thinking about the scope of the President’s war authority, it is
important to consider the President’s ability to threaten war).
288. Recall that an argument along these lines was made, albeit unsuccessfully, in an effort to
broker a compromise on the Versailles Treaty. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
290. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 339 reporters’ note 1 (1987) (arguing that “[a] power so characterized would seem to include the
authority to decide on behalf of the United States to terminate a treaty that no longer serves the
national interest, or is out of date, or which has been breached by the other side” while also stating
that the power to terminate treaties “is implied in [the President’s] office as it has developed over
almost two centuries” (emphasis added)).
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(like Congress) terminate or override a treaty’s domestic effect even when
there is no basis in international law for terminating the treaty.291 That
proposition is highly contested, however, and there is little historical
practice in support of it. Moreover, the unusual decision in 2009 by the
Office of Legal Counsel to withdraw an earlier claim of this authority
renders it even more suspect.292
To say that the President has a unilateral authority to terminate treaties
is not to say that this is an exclusive presidential power. If it is merely a
concurrent power shared with either the full Congress or the Senate, then
either Congress or the Senate could potentially place limitations on it. The
termination authority, in other words, would fall within what Justice
Jackson described in Youngstown as an intermediate “zone of twilight” in
which the President and Congress might have overlapping authority.293 If
Congress or the Senate took action to prohibit presidential termination—for
example, if the Senate made senatorial approval of termination a condition
of its advice and consent to the treaty—then a unilateral presidential
termination in violation of such a condition would cause the President’s
action to fall within what Jackson referred to as the “lowest ebb” of
presidential authority.294
During the debates over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, the
Executive Branch suggested that it viewed the presidential power of

291. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 41, at 214 (arguing that when the President terminates a
treaty, it ceases to exist in international and domestic law); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2218, 2242 (1999) (arguing that because the President, rather than Congress, has full
policymaking control in treaty formation, the President may terminate a treaty unilaterally at will).
292. See supra note 250. This is an example of how international law might at least indirectly
limit presidential authority: if international law causes a treaty to remain in force, then the U.S.
Constitution may give the treaty a domestic-law status that cannot be terminated unilaterally by
the President. A slight potential counterexample occurred in 2005, when the Bush Administration
purported to withdraw the United States from a protocol to a consular convention. The
Administration seemed to suggest that the withdrawal was effective immediately, whereas it was
arguable that international law required a year’s notice. See Kirgis, supra note 246 (discussing the
legal ramifications of withdrawing from the consular convention). For additional consideration of
potential interactions between international law and the separation of powers, see Jean Galbraith,
International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987 (2013).
293. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”);
see also GLENNON, supra note 276, at 152 (arguing that “in the face of congressional silence,
treaty termination by the President does not impinge upon the constitutional prerogatives of the
Senate or Congress”).
294. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has independent power,
absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”).
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termination as exclusive.295 Importantly, though, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee made clear during the debate that it did not accept that
proposition, despite otherwise favoring robust presidential authority with
respect to treaty terminations.296 Moreover, there is no significant historical
practice to support the Executive Branch’s claim. Perhaps for this reason,
the Restatement (Third) contends that if the Senate gave its advice and
consent to a treaty on the condition that any termination occur only with its
consent, and the President proceeded to conclude the treaty, “he would be
bound by the condition.”297 A number of scholars have expressed
agreement with this proposition.298 In its 2001 study on treaties prepared
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Congressional Research
Service correctly noted that “the assertion of an exclusive Presidential
power in the context of a treaty is controversial and flies in the face of a
substantial number of precedents in which the Senate or Congress have
been participants.”299
B.

Constitutional Interpretation and Change

The account given in subpart IV(A) of the current constitutional law of
treaty termination has potential implications for theories of constitutional
interpretation and change. Under that account, a unilateral presidential
termination authority does not exist today because of an assessment of
founding intent or understanding. Nor does it follow clearly from
constitutional text or structure, or from judicial decisions, although those
aspects of constitutional interpretation are of course relevant. Rather, the
President’s constitutional authority for this issue exists in part because some
aspects of U.S. constitutional law are made by the participants in the

295. See Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 205, at 218 (statement of Larry A.
Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel) (“[W]e do not believe that the
Senate may expand that advice and consent power by attaching reservations with respect to
termination.”).
296. See S. REP. NO. 96-119, at 11 (1979) (expressing the view that it was “clear beyond
question” that the Senate could validly limit the President’s authority to terminate a treaty by
placing a condition on such termination in the Senate’s advice and consent to the treaty).
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 339 reporters’ note 3 (1987).
298. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 276, at 156 (arguing that the Constitution compels the
President to follow any termination procedure prescribed by the Senate); Kristen E. Eichensehr,
Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 279–86 (2013) (arguing
that “for cause” limitations imposed by the Senate on the President’s treaty-termination power are
constitutional); see also Powell, supra note 277, at 563 (concluding, based largely on historical
practice, that the power of treaty termination is not exclusive to the President). Presumably,
Congress could similarly limit presidential withdrawal from “congressional–executive
agreements”—that is, international agreements approved or authorized by a majority of both
houses of Congress rather than two-thirds of the Senate. See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 1332–
33 (discussing possible limitations that Congress can place on the President in such agreements).
299. CRS STUDY, supra note 42, at 199.
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system over time. Treaty termination is, in another words, an instance of
what some scholars have termed “constitutional construction”—the fleshing
out of constitutional meaning in ways that go beyond merely interpreting
constitutional text.300
The best description of this constitutional law today is also different
from the description that most constitutional observers would have been
given, say, in 1900. Treaty termination thus provides a vivid illustration of
how constitutional understandings can change even when the courts are not
involved. This change did not occur at one particular moment in time but
rather developed over the course of decades. While the dispute over
President Carter’s termination of the Taiwan Treaty in the late 1970s was
important in leading to a consolidation of presidential authority over this
issue, that consolidation was facilitated by the accretion of claims and
practice that had already occurred. The dynamic described here thus differs
from accounts of constitutional change that focus primarily on dramatic
moments and episodes.301 There are reasons to believe, moreover, that
something like this pattern of constitutional change can be identified for
other issues as well, especially in the area of separation of powers.302

300. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 5 (2011) (noting that the actions of all three
branches of government can contribute to constitutional construction); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 228
(1999) (discussing constitutional construction, the realm in which “the Constitution adapts and
evolves to accommodate and to cause external change”); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG
WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013) (considering how modern war powers authority has been
constitutionally constructed); Alan M. Wachman, Carter’s Constitutional Conundrum: An
Examination of the President’s Unilateral Termination of a Treaty, 8 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
427, 456 (1984) (contending that “a decision [about treaty termination authority] would be a
constitutional construction of our own making, not one found in the document [of the
Constitution]”). For additional discussion of the concept of constitutional construction and the
relationship of this concept to originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013)
(discussing originalism and constitutional construction).
301. See generally, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
(arguing that there are rare instances in American politics of “higher lawmaking” sufficient to
change the Constitution despite the absence of a formal amendment); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008) (exploring the effect of
“constitutional showdowns,” which involve interbranch confrontations that can produce precedent
about the meaning of the Constitution).
302. For preliminary case studies on war powers and congressional–executive agreements that
describe somewhat comparable patterns, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–76. See
also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEXAS L. REV.
961, 1009 (2001) (arguing, in addressing the debate over the constitutionality of congressional–
executive agreements, that constitutional change can and does occur through “increments” rather
than dramatic points in time); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1338, 1355 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (suggesting, in a
consideration of the distribution of war authority between Congress and the President, that the
relevant constitutional law stems from “an accretion of interactions among the branches” that
“gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area”).
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Very likely the change in treaty-termination practice was driven in part
by other changes—such as the increased role of the United States in the
world—that were contributing to the enhancement of Executive authority
across a wide range of issues.303 The growth in both treaty-making in
general, and the increasingly widespread inclusion of unilateral withdrawal
clauses in treaties, probably also were factors. But lawyers, including
lawyers within the State Department as well as legal scholars, also appear to
have played an active role in assessing and influencing the relationship
between the constitutional practice and constitutional understandings.304
While not playing a direct role, the Supreme Court also may have helped
facilitate the shift, through its increasingly deferential posture towards the
Executive Branch starting in the 1930s.305
That constitutional change occurs in the United States in this way does
not necessarily mean, of course, that it is desirable. The lack of modern
resistance by Congress to presidential unilateralism on treaty termination
could be for normatively attractive reasons, such as a recognition that the
President is likely to have better information about the costs and benefits of
such action and will have more negotiating power if he can make threats
that are not dependent on legislative ratification. But this lack of resistance
could be for other reasons, such as a disinterest by members of Congress in
issues that are unlikely to be of concern to constituents, a phenomenon that
may apply to a broad range of foreign-affairs issues, including treaty
termination.306 If so, crediting such inaction might produce socially
undesirable outcomes.
The accretion dynamic described here also implicates tradeoffs
associated more generally with the idea of “common law
constitutionalism,” an approach usually associated with judicial decision
making but which in theory might also apply to constitutional reasoning by
nonjudicial actors.307 On the one hand, having the law develop through the
accretion of precedents can lead to path dependency and, relatedly, a lack of

303. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 146, 189, 192, 202, 208 and accompanying text.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 198–200. Although not explored here, the social
science literature on “historical institutionalism” might offer additional insights for assessing this
sort of change in institutional practice. Recent scholarship in that area has focused on how
institutions change, sometimes dramatically, through incremental shifts. See generally, e.g., PAUL
PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); KATHLEEN
THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY,
BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN (2004).
306. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 442 (describing the focus on reelection as a
primary motivator for the actions of members of Congress).
307. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 925 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation] (describing common law
constitutionalism); see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–42, 46–49 (2010)
(same).
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concentrated deliberation. On the other hand, it can also help ensure that
the law is shaped to address specific, real-world contexts rather than
abstract speculations about the future. This benefit might have particular
salience for foreign relations law issues, such as treaty termination, in light
of the ever-changing nature of the international environment and the United
States’ role within it. The wide variety of situations that might trigger a
decision to suspend or terminate treaty obligations, or to threaten to do so,
also supports an inductive, evolutionary approach to the issue rather than
one based on a general theory or abstract reasoning.
Like any precedent-based approach, the historical gloss method of
discerning the separation of powers also presents interpretive challenges.
As an initial matter, there can be difficult questions about what counts as
relevant practice. For example, it might be unclear how to weight claims of
authority made by institutional actors that are not carried out (such as treaty
terminations that are threatened but then rescinded). In addition, customary
practice is not self-liquidating; it requires interpretation and description,
which inevitably involves an element of judgment and subjectivity.308 Of
course, the same is probably true of other sources of constitutional
interpretation, but the lack of a canonical text may exacerbate the difficulty.
Moreover, if the relevant law is tied to practice, then the law can potentially
change over time, as in fact appears to have happened with respect to the
authority over treaty termination. Although this might be perceived as a
virtue in that it allows the law to adapt to changing conditions, it might also
pose challenges for stability and predictability in the law.309 Again, though,
this is not a problem unique to this interpretive source; constitutional law
can and does change, for example, through Supreme Court interpretations.
At least with Supreme Court opinions, however, there is an understood
public text that serves as a point of reference and potentially also as a stare
decisis break on deviations.
There is another potential problem that relates specifically to the
reliance on historical practice in the area of separation of powers. For a

308. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118, 122 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt eds., 2000) (“[A]ny history of prior decisions will always underdetermine the possible
patterns that might be ascribed to that history.”); Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1089, 1105 (2001) (reviewing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829 (2001)) (“As a theoretical matter, custom has its own problems. Not
least among these are the questions of what counts as the relevant custom, at what level of
generality, and for how long.”). But cf. Michael D. Ramsey, The Limits of Custom in
Constitutional and International Law, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249133 (distinguishing between applications
of custom that do not involve contested value judgments and those that do).
309. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in
the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1869 (noting that constitutional conventions “are
under constant pressure of erosion”).
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variety of reasons, the Executive Branch probably has a greater ability than
Congress to generate both institutional practice and instances of
nonacquiescence.310 If so, then there is an obvious danger that a practicebased approach will favor Executive authority over the long term, which
may contribute to an imbalance of authority between the branches. Indeed,
it is generally thought that presidential authority has expanded in the
modern era relative to congressional authority.311 This phenomenon might
be exacerbated by a tendency of Executive Branch lawyers to over-claim
about past practice, something that appears to have been the case at various
times with respect to the issue of treaty termination.312
Many commentators have suggested that the solution to the potential
imbalance between the ability of Congress and the President to take direct
action is greater judicial review.313 It may well be that some additional
amount of judicial review is needed in the separation of powers area,
especially if judicial abstention is premised on the idea that Congress has
sufficient capacity and incentives to sufficiently guard its institutional
interests.314 At the same time, courts are themselves part of the separation
of powers structure, and thus there is no guarantee that they will be less
acquiescent than Congress when faced with Executive unilateralism.315
310. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 439–45 (discussing structural impediments,
political asymmetries, and issues of congressional–executive relations as explaining why Congress
and the President “are not equally situated in their ability to take action”); see also Terry M. Moe
& William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132,
133–34 (1999) (describing a variety of ways in which presidents can take actions that have legal
effect without the participation of Congress).
311. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2012)
(reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“It is widely recognized that the expansion of presidential power
from the start of the twentieth century onward has been among the central features of American
political development.”).
312. See supra notes 50–52, 218 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 302, at 54 (discussing how the courts’ “relative insulation
from the democratic process . . . situate[s] them uniquely well to police malfunctions in that
process”); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF
LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 7 (1992) (arguing that judges should stop abdicating in favor
of the other branches of government in foreign-affairs cases because they “are much better suited
than is sometimes alleged to make decisions incidentally affecting foreign relations and national
security”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 181–84 (1990) (noting that “the role of judges is to define the
rule of law by drawing the line between illegitimate exercises of political power and legitimate
exercises of legal authority,” in part by moving away from doctrines of abstention in certain types
of cases).
314. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 451–52 (questioning “Madisonian assumptions
about congressional capacity and motivation” and arguing that “courts should be more
circumspect about invoking congressional acquiescence as a basis for deferring to executive
practice”).
315. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1743, 1752 (2013) (“[A]rguments for ‘Madisonian’ judging go wrong by assuming that
judges stand outside the Madisonian system.”); cf. Jide Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs
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Moreover, for a variety of reasons, courts often give weight to established
patterns of governmental practice.316 If so, they might actually reduce
Congress’s ability to resist assertions of presidential authority rather than
enhance it, by instantiating Executive practice into judicial doctrine.
In any event, it is worth noting that the shift to a new understanding of
presidential authority on treaty termination cannot be attributed simply to
Executive aggrandizement. It is striking how actively involved Congress
and the Senate were in these issues in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, even in instances in which presidents sought to act unilaterally.
That sort of congressional focus on treaty termination dissipated, however,
by the 1930s. Although the issue would resurface in select instances of
policy debate, most notably in the debate over the termination of the
Taiwan Treaty, Congress and the Senate no longer sought to protect
institutional prerogatives relating to treaty termination in any systematic
way. Moreover, Congress and the Senate seem largely to have given up on
the issue since the Taiwan debate, mounting only token resistance at the
time of the termination of the ABM Treaty and no resistance at all to
dozens of other presidential terminations.
Whether normatively attractive or not, the influence of historical
practice on the separation of powers is likely to vary depending on the
issue. Treaty termination is an especially good candidate for it, given the
lack of any specific constitutional text relating to the issue.317 The overlay

Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 899–900 (2013) (“Even though judges and academic
commentators may not necessarily be susceptible to the same instrumental motivations as elected
officials, they may very well be plagued by both the kinds of cognitive biases and motivated
reasoning that largely track partisan judgments in the electoral arena.”).
316. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 418–22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
recognition of “the significance of . . . practice-based ‘gloss’” when textual or other forms of
guidance are absent or ambiguous).
317. When there is constitutional text that is perceived to be clear, it is likely to serve as a
focal point for the practice of government actors. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and
Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 708 (2011)
(noting that “it is an indisputable feature of constitutional practice that the text is taken to be
authoritative within its domain”); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers,
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 300–01 (1993) (“Relatively clear [constitutional] provisions in
the separation of powers area may be enforced because they are natural focal points of bargains.”);
Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 307, at 911 (describing “conventionalism” as “a
way of avoiding costly and risky disputes and of expressing respect for fellow citizens” through
“allegiance to the text of the Constitution”). Relatedly, clear text may have a tendency to “crowd
out” norms based on practice. See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION, supra note 284, at 69,
76. That said, whether text is perceived as being clear might itself be affected by practice. See
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text (Feb. 19, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (developing this point). The perception of textual clarity might also be affected
by what is at stake, see Levinson, supra, at 709–10 (asserting that the Constitution is perceived as
being clear on many low-stakes issues but unclear on many high-stakes ones), and by one’s
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of a mix of international-law rules governing treaty termination, as well as
potential distinctions between suspension and termination and between
partial and complete termination, have also made presidential unilateralism
relating to the issue a more complicated target to assess and criticize. In
addition, judicial review has been especially limited for this issue, which
means that the political branches have had to work the issue out themselves,
without even much of a shadow of judicial supervision. On issues for
which there is more textual guidance, a less complicated legal landscape, or
a greater likelihood of judicial intervention, practice is likely to play a lesser
role. Certainly decisions like INS v. Chadha318 confirm that the Supreme
Court will not inevitably give effect to even longstanding political-branch
practice.319
C.

Is It Law?

Another challenge to the practice-based approach to constitutional
authority described in this Article would be to dismiss it as merely an
account of politics rather than law. The argument would be that, without
any dispositive judicial resolution, the practice will simply be the result of
the push and pull of the political process. The constitutional “law” of treaty
termination, on this account, would merely be a pattern of behavior without
normative significance.320 If so, it might not be entitled to any particular
weight in debates about constitutional interpretation.
As an initial matter, it is not clear why judicial review is so central to
this purported distinction between politics and law.
Presidential
compliance with judicial decisions is itself a practice-based norm of U.S.
constitutional law. It is largely taken for granted today, but this has not
always been the case. As Daryl Levinson has noted, “[c]asting courts as
constitutional enforcers merely pushes the question back to why powerful
political actors are willing to pay attention to what judges say; why ‘people
with money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels.’”321

constitutional methodology, see Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 75, 81 (2013) (“Whether a text is ambiguous is itself determined by one’s chosen
interpretive method.”).
318. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
319. Id. at 944–45, 959 (holding that a “legislative veto” provision enacted by Congress was
unconstitutional even though Congress had enacted hundreds of legislative veto provisions since
the 1930s).
320. Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1836 (2009) (“We might also understand the
settlement of non-textual constitutional issues as instances of successful coordination.”); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 301, at 1002 (“Precedents may just be patterns of behavior that parties
recognize as providing focal points that permit cooperation or coordination.”).
321. Levinson, supra note 317, at 661 (quoting Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil
Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 60
(2003)).
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To be sure, there is a strand of British (and, more generally,
Commonwealth) constitutional thinking that would limit the term
“constitutional law” to norms that are enforceable by the judiciary. Under
this view, associated most notably with the writings of A.V. Dicey, norms
of constitutional practice that are not judicially enforceable are termed
instead “constitutional conventions.”322 This distinction, however, does not
map well onto U.S. constitutional understandings. For example, there are a
variety of nonjusticiability doctrines in U.S. law, such as the political
question doctrine, that hypothesize that there can be constitutional law that
might not be judicially enforceable.323 In addition, there has been a
significant emphasis in U.S. scholarship in recent years on the importance
of “constitutional law outside the courts,”324 an approach that implicitly
declines to equate constitutional law simply with what is enforced by the
judiciary. The longstanding idea of “underenforced constitutional norms”
similarly is based on the idea that constitutional law is broader than what is
judicially enforceable.325
In any event, the likelihood of judicial review for the issue of treaty
termination is not zero, and in fact the lower federal courts did address the
issue in the controversy over the termination of the Taiwan Treaty.326 Thus,
even if a shadow of possible judicial review were needed in order for a
norm to have a legal character, such a shadow does exist for this issue,
although it may be faint. Moreover, we know that courts often take account
of longstanding practices when interpreting the separation of powers.327

322. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
361, 366 (6th ed. 1902) (“‘[C]onventions of the constitution’ . . . [are] customs, practices, maxims,
or precepts which are not enforced or recognised by the Courts” and “cannot be enforced by any
Court of law [and so] have no claim to be considered laws”); see also Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2013) (noting this point).
323. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The issue
[before the Court] is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”).
324. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
325. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (stating that “constitutional norms
which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their
full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be
understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm”
rather than the boundaries of the norms themselves); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1299 (2006)
(crediting Sager’s argument that “it would be a mistake to equate judicial enforcement, and thus
the tests applied by courts, with the meaning of constitutional guarantees”).
326. The Supreme Court has also recently signaled a narrow view of the political question
doctrine, even in the area of foreign affairs. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012)
(describing the political question doctrine as a “narrow exception” to the judiciary’s obligation to
decide cases).
327. See supra notes 53–62 and accompanying text.

BRADLEY.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss

3/24/2014 12:07 PM

833

Another potential answer to the “it’s all politics” critique is the simple
observation that participants in the legal system generally view the issue of
treaty termination as governed by legal norms. As noted earlier, at least
according to legal philosophers working in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart,
whether something is “law” depends on social facts—that is, it depends on
whether the relevant community treats it as law.328 Under that conception,
it is significant that Congress, the Executive Branch, and legal scholars
have long treated the issue of treaty termination as one of constitutional law
and that they have viewed historical practice as relevant to determining the
content of this law. The issue of treaty termination can therefore be
distinguished from other customary conventions of U.S. constitutional
practice that are not viewed as legal in character, such as (to take one
example) the convention of senatorial courtesy for judicial appointments.329
To say that the issue of treaty termination is one of constitutional law
does not mean that the law on this issue is fully settled. It is conceivable
that the Senate or Congress at some point could assert itself on this issue,
especially in a situation in which there was significant policy disagreement
with the President’s decision to terminate a particular treaty. It is even
conceivable that the Senate or Congress could successfully force a President
to back down, or at least to seek formal legislative approval for a
termination. But the description of the constitutional law set forth above in
subpart (IV)(A) is probably both the best prediction of likely future practice
and also the best prediction of the position of the courts if they were at
some point to intervene in this area. In any event, many issues of
constitutional law are not entirely settled even after being resolved by the
Supreme Court, especially if the Court is closely divided, and this fact is not
viewed by itself as making constitutional law merely epiphenomenal.
Notwithstanding these points, the dynamic between Congress and the
Executive Branch with respect to treaty termination is obviously
intertwined with political, and not just legal, considerations. Political
realities, such as the President’s first-mover advantage over Congress and
the tendency of members of Congress to support the President if he is of the
same party, are likely to play a role in how the legal norms governing this
issue develop. It is no coincidence that the most significant controversy
over presidential termination of treaties occurred in connection with the
Taiwan Treaty and associated recognition of mainland China, surrounding

328. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
329. Scholarship on U.S. constitutional conventions has tended to mix together legal and
nonlegal practices. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 333–
87 (2012); HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23–43
(1925). For a useful effort to distinguish between conventions based on whether they impose
“thin” or “thick” obligations, see Vermeule, supra note 322, at 1186–91. See also Dorf, supra
note 317, at 89 (distinguishing between entrenched practices and constitutionally normative
practices).
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which there was substantial policy disagreement. Legally normative
conventions in this context are therefore affected, perhaps heavily, by
politics.330 But this does not mean that these conventions entirely collapse
into politics.331 Moreover, this blending of law and politics almost certainly
describes constitutional law in other contexts as well.332
There are also likely still some legal constraints on presidential action
in this area. It can reasonably be predicted, for example, that if the Senate
conditioned its advice and consent to a treaty on senatorial approval of any
termination, and a president later attempted to ignore that condition, there
would be significant resistance, even by senators of the President’s own
party.333 Moreover, this resistance would likely be framed and debated in
legal terms. It is also likely that, when deciding whether to take such
action, the President would be advised by lawyers who would consider past
governmental practice in assessing the state of the law. None of this is to
suggest that these considerations would be dispositive in presidential
decision making, just that they would likely be a factor.
Despite these points, a focus on the role of historical practice in
discerning the separation of powers almost inevitably mixes together
internal and external perspectives on the law.334 As noted, invocations of
such practice have long been part of the internal legal argumentation in
debates over treaty termination. At the same time, there are a variety of

330. In answer to a question, noted above, that was posed by Bruce Ackerman after President
Bush announced that he was terminating the ABM Treaty, see supra note 248 and accompanying
text, politics (both domestic and international) would likely operate as a significant constraint on
unilateral presidential termination of something like the NATO pact or the UN Charter.
331. See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 5 (2013) (“Rather than obsess about
whether constitutionalism is pure law or pure politics, we should study the distinctive ways
American constitutionalism blends legal and political considerations.”). See generally Curtis A.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (explaining why a connection between practicebased understandings of constitutional authority and political considerations does not make the
understandings nonlegal).
332. For example, efforts to reconcile the political and legal aspects of the Supreme Court’s
exercise of constitutional judicial review are longstanding and include perhaps most famously
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962). See also Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and
Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 695 (2012) (“Scholars today widely recognize that Supreme
Court opinions are not purely legal but, to some degree, reflect the ideology of the Justices.”).
333. An analogous issue concerns executive agreements: Despite the general rise of
congressional–executive agreements in lieu of Article II treaties, the Senate has made clear at
various times that it believes that significant arms-control agreements must be concluded as
Article II treaties, and there has been successful bipartisan resistance in the Senate—framed in
legal terms—to presidential efforts to do otherwise. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at
473–75 (describing this resistance).
334. See HART, supra note 284, at 89 (distinguishing between the “external” perspective of
someone who is merely an observer of the rules of a social group and the “internal” perspective of
someone who is a member of the group and “accepts and uses [the rules] as guides to conduct”).
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reasons to think that such practice also has an external effect on the
development of the law relating to this issue, whether such law is
interpreted by the courts or by nonjudicial actors. There is tension between
these two accounts since the more that the account is external, the more that
the law will seem epiphenomenal. It is at least plausible to think, however,
that the internal and external accounts are interrelated, such that historical
practice not only affects legal understandings but is also itself affected by
such understandings.
Conclusion
Termination of treaties by the United States provides an important
illustration of how historical practice can inform and even define the
separation of powers. The constitutional text does not specifically address
the issue, so practice has by necessity long played a central role in the legal
analysis. Particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—and
then again in the controversy in the 1970s over the termination of the
Taiwan Treaty—debates in Congress repeatedly focused on practice as
relevant evidence of constitutional meaning. Legal advisers in the
Executive Branch have also long emphasized the importance of practice in
assessing the Constitution’s distribution of authority over this issue. In
addition to showing how practices can inform constitutional interpretation,
the issue of treaty termination enriches our understanding of constitutional
change. The twentieth-century shift towards a unilateral presidential power
of termination was not the result of one particular controversy or period of
deliberation, and it was not primarily driven by judicial decisions. Instead,
the shift involved a gradual accretion of actions and claims by the Executive
Branch combined with long periods of inaction by Congress. This account
sheds light on some of the interpretive and normative challenges associated
with a practice-based approach to the separation of powers.

